Inligting

USSR lei die ruimtewedloop


Die Sowjetunie begin Voskhod 1 in 'n wentelbaan om die aarde, met kosmonaute Vladamir Komarov, Konstantin Feoktistov en Boris Yegorov aan boord. Voskhod 1 was die eerste ruimtetuig wat 'n meervoudige bemanning vervoer het, en die tweedaagse sending was ook die eerste vlug wat sonder ruimtepakke uitgevoer is.

In die laat 1950's en vroeë 1960's het die Amerikaanse ruimteprogram konsekwent die Sowjet -program in die eerste ruimte gelei, 'n patroon wat drasties verander het met die oorwinning van die Amerikaanse maanprogram in die laat 1960's en vroeë 1970's.

LEES MEER: The Space Race


Amerikaanse ervaring

"Ek glo dat [Apollo -programdirekteur George Low] beslis besorg was, en tereg dat ons die maan voor die Amerikaners kon wentel. Ons het alles daarvoor gehad. Daarom het hy dinge so vinnig verander. In plaas van om 'n wentelbaan te draai. op die aarde, het hy besluit om direk [na die maan] te vlieg. Ons kon dit ses maande tevore gedoen het. Hy het baie goeie inligting gehad. Hy het nie gedink dat [Soyuz ontwerphoof Vasily] Mishin so versigtig en besluiteloos sou wees nie. - kosmonaut Alexei Leonov

Peter Gorin. NASA.

Die Space Race was 'n geveg in die Koue Oorlog, 'n tegnologiese stryd wat deur Sowjet- en Amerikaanse wetenskaplikes en ingenieurs gevoer is, en deur Sowjet -kosmonaute en Amerikaanse ruimtevaarders. Alhoewel dit intellektueel van aard was, was dit 'n stryd waarin elke lewensverlies aan weerskante deur alle deelnemers getreur is.

'N Regte vyand
Op 4 Oktober 1957 het die Sowjetunie Spoetnik gelanseer. Amerikaners was bang vir die implikasies van die eerste mensgemaakte satelliet wat om die aarde wentel. Ruimtevaarder Frank Borman onthou: 'Ek het op West Point onderrig toe Sputnik aangekondig word. die geweer gespring en 'n satelliet gelanseer, en dit was 'n enorme impak. Die [Amerikaanse] publiek het ons onderwysstelsel begin bevraagteken, hulle het die Eisenhower-administrasie bevraagteken. Dit was 'n tyd van baie, baie ernstige selfvertroue in die hele samelewing. "

Sowjette vorder onderduim
Die Sowjette het voortgegaan om 'n bemande ruimteprogram te bevorder terwyl die Amerikaners gesukkel het om in te haal. Volgens Borman, "het hulle ons eers met die vuis geslaan. Yuri Gagarin, die eerste mens wat om 'n wentelbaan gegaan het. Hulle het ons teen 'n ruimtewandeling geslaan. Die eerste vrou in die ruimte, die eerste meervoudige bemanning in die ruimte." Die Sowjets het hul program onder die knie gehou en elke sukses eers aangekondig nadat dit gebeur het.

Yuri Gagarin. NASA

Botsings en skilpaaie
Kort na Spoetnik het die Sowjete hul aandag op die maan gevestig. Onbemande sondes is in 1958 op die maan gelanseer. Teen 1959 het Luna 2 op die maan neergestort-die eerste mensgemaakte voorwerp op die maanoppervlak-en teen Oktober daardie jaar het 'n derde sonde omgedraai en die ander kant van die foto afgeneem die maan. In September 1968 het die vyfde missie van die Zond -ruimtetuig skilpaaie op 'n omseiling van die maan en terug aarde toe gedra. Die volgende stap sou 'n bemande sending om die maan wees.

'N Kosmonaut se verdediging
Kosmonaut Alexei Leonov was die eerste man wat in die ruimte geloop het. In 1967 is hy gewerf om op te lei vir die maanprogram van sy land. Hy herinner aan die Sowjet -reaksie op die maanras: "Ons mense was oortuig dat ons die eerste op die maan sou wees omdat hulle gewoond was daaraan dat ons altyd die eerste, die eerste, die eerste was. Net ons, die kosmonaute, en veral die maanpersoneel, het besef dat dit nie gaan gebeur nie. Dit was nie die karakter nie, dit was finansiering wat hier 'n rol gespeel het. Ons het geweet dat die VSA $ 25 miljard belê het. Ons het 2,5 miljard roebels in die hele ruimte belê program, vir beide bemande en onbemande vlugte. Dit was tien keer minder. Die maanpersoneel het besef dat ons ses maande vroeër as Frank Borman die maan kon omseil, maar ons het geweet dat ons nie op die maan vorentoe sou kon land nie van die ruimtevaarders. "

Huiwering
Alhoewel 'n maanlanding ver buite bereik was, was die kosmonaute gereed om na die maan en terug te vlieg, 'n reis wat 'n beslissende oorwinning in die ruimtewedloop sou wees. Maar hul administrateurs wankel by die uitdaging. Kosmonaut Leonov blameer die hoofontwerper: "Sekerlik was dit slegs die besluiteloosheid van ons destydse hoofontwerper, Vasily Pavlovich Mishin, wat ons in hierdie program laat agter raak het. Ek kan met volle vertroue sê dat as [hoofontwerper vir ruimtetuie] ] Sergei Pavlovich Korolev geleef het, sou ons ses maande voor Apollo 8 om die maan gevlieg het. "

Mislukkings Let op
Vasily Mishin, hoof van die Soyuz -ontwerpburo, was moontlik huiwerig weens vorige missies. Net soos die Apollo -program ondervind het, het die Sowjet -ruimteprogram 'n groot terugslag beleef weens 'n sterfgeval. Soyuz One het op 23 April 1967 opgestyg, met Vladimir Komarov aan boord. By heringang is Komarov dood toe die valskerms op sy ruimteskip nie behoorlik ontplooi het nie.

Neem 'n uitdaging
Terwyl die Sowjets geraak het, het berigte oor hul tegnologie NASA -administrateurs aangespoor om die missieplan van Appollo 8 na 'n maanbaan te verander. Die besluit het die ingenieurs, vlugbeheerders en ruimtevaarders slegs vier maande gegee om voor te berei vir die nuwe missie. Einde 1968 het Apollo 8 die taak van die agentskap voltooi.

Verlore geleentheid
Leonov herinner aan die reaksie in die Sowjetunie: "Daar was baie briewe aan die regering gerig, wat almal gevra het hoe dit kon gebeur het, hoe het Amerikaners ons voorgelê. Daar was baie briewe wat die regering se onbedagsaamheid en beskuldigdes veroordeel ons hoofontwerpers om so 'n wonderlike geleentheid te verloor en dit aan die Amerikaners weg te gee. Dit was 'n openlike ontevredenheid. "

Leierskap misluk
Ruimtevaarder Jim Lovell het sedertdien die wedloop na die maan met sy voormalige mededingers bespreek. "Ons praat nou met ons Russiese vriende en die kosmonaute. Hulle erken nou dat Apollo 8 regtig 'n knou was vir hul psige, vermoed ek, 'n knou vir hul aansien dat ons die maan kon omring toe ons dit gedoen het, want hulle was Hulle Lunar Module -voertuig, die N1, was natuurlik 'n mislukking. Hulle het geweet dat hulle nie eers op die maan kon beland nie, maar hulle het gedink dat hulle 'n baie goeie kans het om die maan ten minste te vaar voor Apollo 8. En ek dink een van die mislukkings, die leiersfoute, destyds veral in die Sowjet -ruimte -aktiwiteit, was die wankeling heen en weer van 'Moet ons dit nou doen, of moet ons wag en nog 'n onbemande doen en om seker te maak dat ons hierdie missie kan uitvoer? ? ' Toe was hulle baie versigtige mense.

Slagfronte van die Koue Oorlog
Frank Borman het sy mening oor Apollo se impak gedeel: "Na my mening was daar drie [Koue Oorlog] gevegte. Een was Korea. Ons het dit vasgemaak. Een was Viëtnam. Ons het dit verloor. En een was die ruimteprogram en ons het dit gewen! En Ek dink dat die demonstrasie van die Amerikaanse tegnologie, Amerikaanse bestuursvermoë - mense vergeet die feit dat die bestuurstegnieke wat in Apollo ontwikkel is, uiters belangrik is vir hierdie land. . "


Inhoud

Vooroorlogse pogings Redigeer

Die teorie van ruimteverkenning het 'n stewige basis gehad in die Russiese Ryk voor die Eerste Wêreldoorlog met die geskrifte van Konstantin Tsiolkovsky (1857-1935), wat baanbrekerpapiere in die laat 19de en vroeë 20ste eeu gepubliseer het en in 1929 die konsep van die veelvlakkige vuurpyl. Praktiese aspekte gebou op vroeë eksperimente wat deur lede van die reaktiewe voortstuwingsstudiegroep, GIRD (in 1931 gestig), in die 1920's en 1930's uitgevoer is, waar baanbrekers soos die Oekraïense ingenieur Sergey Korolev - wat daarvan gedroom het om na Mars [7] te reis: 5 - en die Baltiese Duitse ingenieur Friedrich Zander het gewerk. Op 18 Augustus 1933 het GIRD die eerste Sowjet-vuurpyl Gird-09, [8] geloods en op 25 November 1933 die eerste hibriede vuurpyl GIRD-X. In 1940-41 het nog 'n vooruitgang op die gebied van reaktiewe aandrywing plaasgevind: die ontwikkeling en reeksproduksie van die Katyusha [9] veelvouerraketlanseerder.

Die Duitsers Edit

Gedurende die dertigerjare was die Sowjet -vuurpyltegnologie vergelykbaar met dié van Duitsland, maar Joseph Stalin se groot suiwering het die vordering daarvan erg beskadig. Baie vooraanstaande ingenieurs is verban, en Korolev en ander is in die Goelag opgesluit. [7]: 10–14 Alhoewel die Katyusha tydens die Tweede Wêreldoorlog baie effektief was aan die Oosfront, het die gevorderde toestand van die Duitse vuurpylprogram Sowjet -ingenieurs verbaas wat die oorskot by Peenemünde en Mittelwerk geïnspekteer het na die einde van die oorlog in Europa. Die Amerikaners het in die geheim die meeste vooraanstaande Duitse wetenskaplikes en 100 V-2-vuurpyle na Operation Unitedclips na die Verenigde State verskuif, maar die Sowjet-program het groot baat gevind by gevange Duitse vervaardigingsgereedskap wat van die V-2-produksieterreine Mittelwerk in Oos-Duitsland verkry is. [7]: 20,25,27,29–31,56 Vanaf Julie 1945 het die Sowjets Duitse wetenskaplikes en werkers ingeroep vir die Institut Nordhausen in Bleicherode om die verlore ontwerptekeninge en ingenieursdata te herstel en die vervaardiging en samestelling van V-2-komponente in Duitsland te herstel. Hierdie operasie is opgestel deur Dimitri Ustinov, Sergei Korolev, Valentin Glushko en Boris Chertok. [10] Helmut Gröttrup, 'n opvallende kenner van beheerstelsels uit Peenemünde, is aangestel as algemene direkteur van Institut Nordhausen, ook genoem Zentralwerke, wat tot Oktober 1946 tot meer as 5000 werknemers gegroei het.

Op 22 Oktober 1946 het Operasie Osoaviakhim meer as 2 200 Duitse spesialiste-'n totaal van meer as 6 000 mense, insluitend familielede-met geweld uit die Sowjet-besettingsgebied van Duitsland na die Tweede Wêreldoorlog verwyder vir werk in die Sowjetunie. 160 spesialiste van Institut Nordhausen, onder leiding van Helmut Gröttrup, is tot 1953 op die eiland Gorodomlya gehou. As die eerste taak moes hulle die Sowjette ondersteun in die bou van 'n replika van die V-2 wat die R-1 genoem is en suksesvol gelanseer is in Oktober 1948. [7]: 30,80–82 Die Sowjette het uiteindelik konsepte aangevra van kragtiger versterkers vir 'n groter vrag en reikafstand, dws kernkopkoppe en langafstandafstand. Daarom, van 1947 tot 1950, stel die Duitse kollektief konsepte voor vir die G-1, G-2 en G-4 met talle ontwerpverbeterings ten opsigte van die V-2-status: [11]

  • Versameling vuurpylenjins saam, met die moontlikheid om 'n enjinonderbreking te vergoed deur die simmetries teenoorgestelde enjin af te skakel (in die latere R-7 Semyorka- en Sputnik-lanseerder is 4 x 4 vir die eerste fase en 4 enjins vir die tweede fase gebundel)
  • Vektorbestuur van enjins deur te draai in plaas van die komplekse (en swaar) V-2-vane wat van grafiet gemaak is
  • Koniese vorm van die vuurpylliggaam vir doeltreffende en stabiele aërodinamika, wat nie uitgebreide windtunneltoetse vereis vir optimalisering oor die hele snelheidsbereik en gepaardgaande tenklading nie (later geïmplementeer deur die R-7)
  • Gebruik tenks as 'n ondersteunende struktuur vir aansienlike gewigsvermindering
  • Meer akkurate teikenbeheer deur verbeterde gyrosisteme, insluitend simulasiestelsels vir toetsing
  • Ry turbines met uitlaatgas uit die verbrandingskamer vir groter doeltreffendheid (wat uiteindelik in die RD-180-ontwerp geslaag het).

Korolev het dele van hierdie voorstelle gebruik vir die Sowjet-ontwikkelings R-2, R-5 en R-14. Vroeg in 1954 het die CIA die Duitse konsepstudies en die Sowjet -belangstelling daarin opgesom, gebaseer op verslae van teruggekeerde Duitse wetenskaplikes, waaronder Fritz Karl Preikschat en Helmut Gröttrup. Daar was bewyse dat die Sowjets, vanweë hul "liefde vir vuurpyltegnologie" en "hul respek vir Duitse werk", die eerste kan wees wat langafstandraketten het. [12] Om politieke redes is die Duitse impak op die Sowjet -raket- en ruimteprogram egter lankal onderskat.

Die byna agt jaar se betrokkenheid van die Duitse wetenskaplikes by die Sowjet -raketprogram was 'n noodsaaklike katalisator vir die verdere vordering daarvan. Tydens die bestaan ​​van die USSR het Sowjet-historici selde, indien ooit, melding gemaak van die gebruik van Duitse kundigheid in die naoorlogse jare, maar die samewerking was werklik en uiters deurslaggewend om die Sowjet-doelwitte te bevorder. [. ] Die span van Gröttrup was onontbeerlik om die databasis van Duitse prestasies vinnig aan die Sowjetunie oor te dra, en het sodoende 'n sterk grondslag gebied om voort te gaan.

Korolev se OKB-1-ontwerpburo was toegewy aan die vloeibare brandstofkryogene vuurpyle waarmee hy in die laat dertigerjare geëksperimenteer het. Uiteindelik het hierdie werk gelei tot die ontwerp van die R-7 Semyorka [13] interkontinentale ballistiese missiel (ICBM) wat suksesvol getoets is in Augustus 1957. Hierdie Sowjet-prestasie was gebaseer op 'n sterk toewyding en streng koördinering van alle militêre entiteite, met Dmitry Ustinov en Sergei Korolev as die belangrikste dryfvere.

Die Sowjet-ruimteprogram was gekoppel aan die USSR se vyfjaarplanne en was van die begin af afhanklik van die steun van die Sowjet-weermag. Alhoewel hy 'alleen gedryf deur die droom van ruimtevaart' was, het Korolev dit in die algemeen geheim gehou terwyl hy aan militêre projekte gewerk het-veral na die Sowjetunie se eerste atoombomtoets in 1949, 'n missiel wat 'n kernkop kon dra na die Verenigde State - net soos baie mense bespot het met die idee om satelliete te lanseer en ruimtetuie te beman. Nietemin, die eerste Sowjet -vuurpyl met diere aan boord wat in Julie 1951 gelanseer is, is die twee honde lewend teruggevind nadat hulle 101 km in hoogte bereik het. Twee maande voor Amerika se eerste sodanige prestasie, het hierdie en daaropvolgende vlugte die Sowjetunie waardevolle ervaring met ruimtegeneeskunde gegee. [7]: 84–88,95–96,118

As gevolg van sy wêreldwye omvang en 'n groot vrag van ongeveer vyf ton, was die betroubare R-7 nie net effektief as 'n strategiese afleweringstelsel vir kernkragkoppe nie, maar ook as 'n uitstekende basis vir 'n ruimtetuig. Die aankondiging van die Verenigde State in Julie 1955 van sy plan om 'n satelliet tydens die Internasionale Geofisiese Jaar te lanseer, het Korolev baie baat gevind by die oortuiging van die Sowjet -leier Nikita Chroesjtsjof om sy planne te ondersteun. [7]: 148–151 In 'n brief wat aan Chroesjtsjof gerig is, beklemtoon Korolev die noodsaaklikheid om 'n 'eenvoudige satelliet' te lanseer om met die Amerikaanse ruimte -inspanning mee te ding. [14] Planne is goedgekeur vir satelliete wat om die aarde wentel (Spoetnik) om kennis van die ruimte op te doen, en vier onbemande militêre verkenningssatelliete, Zenit. Verdere beplande ontwikkelings het vereis dat 'n bemande aarde -vlug teen 1964 en 'n onbemande maansending vroeër sou wees.

Nadat die eerste Spoetnik 'n suksesvolle propaganda-staatsgreep was, is Korolev-nou slegs in die openbaar bekend as die anonieme "Hoofontwerper van Rocket-Space Systems" [7]: 168–169-aangekla om die bemanningsprogram te versnel, waarvan die ontwerp is gekombineer met die Zenit -program om die Vostok -ruimtetuig te vervaardig. Na Spoetnik het Sowjet-wetenskaplikes en programleiers dit voorgestel om 'n bemande stasie te vestig om die gevolge van nul-swaartekrag en die langtermyn effekte op lewensvorme in 'n ruimte-omgewing te bestudeer. [15] Nog steeds beïnvloed deur Tsiolkovsky-wat Mars as die belangrikste doelwit vir ruimtereise gekies het-in die vroeë 1960's het die Sowjet-program onder Korolev beduidende planne gemaak vir bemanningsreise na Mars, so vroeg as 1968 tot 1970. Met 'n geslote lewe ondersteuningsstelsels en elektriese vuurpyl -enjins, en van groot wentelruimstasies gelanseer, was hierdie planne baie meer ambisieus as Amerika se doelwit om op die maan te land. [7]: 333–337

Befondsing en ondersteuning Redigeer

Die Sowjet -ruimteprogram was sekondêr in militêre befondsing vir die ICBM's van die Strategic Rocket Forces. Terwyl die Weste geglo het dat Chroesjtsjov elke nuwe ruimtemissie persoonlik bestel het vir propagandadoeleindes, en die Sowjet -leier 'n buitengewoon noue verhouding met Korolev en ander hoofontwerpers gehad het, het Chroesjtsjof klem gelê op missiele eerder as ruimteverkenning en was hy nie baie geïnteresseerd in die kompetisie met Apollo nie. [7]: 351.408.426–427

Terwyl die regering en die Kommunistiese Party die program se suksesse as propaganda -instrumente gebruik het nadat dit plaasgevind het, was sistematiese planne vir missies op grond van politieke redes skaars, een uitsondering was Valentina Tereshkova, die eerste vrou in die ruimte, op Vostok 6 in 1963. [7] : 351 Missies is beplan op grond van vuurpylbeskikbaarheid of ad hoc -redes, eerder as wetenskaplike doeleindes. Die regering het byvoorbeeld in Februarie 1962 skielik 'n ambisieuse missie beveel waarby twee Vostoks gelyktydig in 'n wentelbaan gelanseer is, wat 'binne tien dae' gelanseer is om John Glenn se Mercury-Atlas 6 daardie maand te verduister. 4. [7]: 354–361

Anders as die Amerikaanse ruimteprogram, wat NASA as 'n enkele koördinerende struktuur gehad het wat deur sy administrateur, James Webb, gedurende die grootste deel van die sestigerjare gelei is, is die USSR -program tussen verskeie mededingende ontwerpgroepe verdeel. Ondanks die merkwaardige suksesse van die Sputniks tussen 1957 en 1961 en Vostoks tussen 1961 en 1964, het Korolev se OKB-1-ontwerpburo na 1958 toenemende mededinging ondergaan van sy mededingende hoofontwerpers, Mikhail Yangel, Valentin Glushko en Vladimir Chelomei. Korolev was van plan om voort te gaan met die Soyuz-vaartuig en die N-1 swaar booster, wat die basis sou wees vir 'n permanente bemande ruimtestasie en die verkenning van die maan. Dmitri Ustinov het hom egter opdrag gegee om te fokus op naby-aarde missies met behulp van die Voskhod-ruimtetuig, 'n aangepaste Vostok, sowel as op onbemande missies na die nabygeleë planete Venus en Mars.

Yangel was die assistent van Korolev, maar met die steun van die weermag het hy in 1954 sy eie ontwerpburo gekry om hoofsaaklik aan die militêre ruimteprogram te werk. Dit het 'n sterker ontwerpers vir raketmotors gehad, insluitend die gebruik van hipergoliese brandstowwe, maar na die ramp in Nedelin in 1960 het Yangel hom daarop toegespits om op ICBM -ontwikkeling te konsentreer. Hy het ook voortgegaan om sy eie swaar boosterontwerpe te ontwikkel, soortgelyk aan die N-1 van Korolev, vir militêre toepassings en vir vragvlugte die ruimte in om toekomstige ruimtestasies te bou.

Glushko was die hoofontwerper vir vuurpylmotors, maar hy het 'n persoonlike wrywing met Korolev gehad en het geweier om die groot enkelkamer -kryogene enjins te ontwikkel wat Korolev nodig gehad het om swaar boosters te bou.

Chelomey het baat by die beskerming van Khrushchev [7]: 418 en het in 1960 die pruim gekry om 'n vuurpyl te ontwikkel om 'n bemande voertuig om die maan en 'n militêre ruimtestasie te stuur. Met beperkte ruimte -ervaring was sy ontwikkeling stadig.

Die vordering van die Apollo -program het die hoofontwerpers ontstel, wat elkeen vir sy eie program gepleit het as die reaksie. Veelvuldige, oorvleuelende ontwerpe het goedkeuring gekry, en nuwe voorstelle bedreig reeds goedgekeurde projekte. As gevolg van Korolev se "enkelvoudige volharding", in Augustus 1964 - meer as drie jaar nadat die Verenigde State sy voornemens verklaar het - het die Sowjetunie uiteindelik besluit om om die maan mee te ding. Dit het die doelwit gestel van 'n maanlanding in 1967 - die 50ste herdenking van die Oktoberrevolusie - of 1968. [7]: 406-408, 420 In 'n stadium in die vroeë 1960's was die Sowjet -ruimteprogram aktief besig om 30 projekte vir lanseerders en ruimtetuig. [ aanhaling nodig ] Met die val van Krushchev in 1964 het Korolev volledige beheer oor die bemande program gekry.

In 1961 word Valentin Bondarenko, 'n ruimtevaarder en lid van die Vostok -ruimtetuig, in 'n uithouvermoë -eksperiment dood nadat die kamer waarin hy was, aan die brand gesteek het. Die Sowjetunie het gekies om sy dood te verbloem en voort te gaan met die ruimteprogram. [17]

Korolev is in Januarie 1966 oorlede, na 'n roetine -operasie wat kolonkanker ontbloot het, as gevolg van komplikasies van hartsiektes en ernstige bloeding. Kerim Kerimov, [18], wat voorheen 'n argitek van Vostok 1 was, [19] is aangestel as voorsitter van die staatskommissie vir vlieënde vlugte en was die hoof van die komende 25 jaar (1966-1991). Hy het toesig gehou oor elke stadium van ontwikkeling en werking van beide ruimtekomplekse en bemande interplanetêre stasies vir die voormalige Sowjetunie. Een van Kerimov se grootste prestasies was die bekendstelling van Mir in 1986.

Die leiding van die OKB-1-ontwerpburo is gegee aan Vasily Mishin, wat die taak gehad het om 'n mens in 1967 om die maan te stuur en in 1968 'n mens daarop te laat land. . Onder druk het Mishin die bekendstelling van die Soyuz 1 -vlug in 1967 goedgekeur, al was die vaartuig nog nooit suksesvol getoets op 'n onbemande vlug nie. Die missie het begin met bekende ontwerpprobleme en het geëindig met die voertuig wat op die grond neergestort het en Vladimir Komarov doodgemaak het. Dit was die eerste noodlottige dood tydens 'n ruimteprogram.

Na hierdie tragedie en onder nuwe druk het Mishin 'n drankprobleem ontwikkel. Die Sowjets is verslaan deur die eerste bemanningsvlug in 1968 deur Apollo 8 om die maan te stuur, maar Mishin het voortgegaan met die ontwikkeling van die gebrekkige super -swaar N1, in die hoop dat die Amerikaners 'n terugslag sou hê, en genoeg tyd gelaat het om die N1 te haal werkbaar en laat eers 'n man op die maan land. Daar was 'n sukses met die gesamentlike vlug van Soyuz 4 en Soyuz 5 in Januarie 1969 wat die ontmoetings-, dok- en bemanningstegnieke wat vir die landing gebruik sou word, getoets het, en die LK -lander is suksesvol getoets in 'n wentelbaan. Maar nadat vier onbekwame toetsbekendstellings van die N1 misluk het, is die program vir twee jaar opgeskort en dan gekanselleer, wat die kans op die Sowjetunie voor die Verenigde State op die maan laat beland het.

Behalwe die bemande landings, bevat die verlate Sowjet -maanprogram die veeldoelige maanbasis Zvezda, eers uiteengesit met ontwikkelde besprekings van ekspedisievoertuie [20] en oppervlakmodules. [21]

Na hierdie terugslag oortuig Chelomey Ustinov om in 1970 'n program goed te keur om sy militêre ruimtestasie in Almaz te bevorder om die Amerikaanse aangekondigde Skylab te verslaan. Mishin bly in beheer van die projek wat Salyut geword het, maar die besluit wat deur Mishin gesteun is om 'n bemanning van drie mans sonder drukspakke te vlieg eerder as 'n tweemanspersoneel met pakke na Salyut 1 in 1971, was noodlottig toe die heringangskapsule die moord onder druk laat sit het die bemanning by hul terugkeer na die aarde. Mishin is uit baie projekte verwyder, met Chelomey wat weer beheer oor Salyut gekry het. Nadat hulle saam met NASA gewerk het oor die Apollo -Soyuz, het die Sowjet -leierskap besluit dat 'n nuwe bestuursbenadering nodig is, en in 1974 is die N1 gekanselleer en Mishin was nie meer op kantoor nie. Die ontwerpburo is hernoem tot NPO Energia met Glushko as hoofontwerper.

In teenstelling met die probleme wat in die vroeë bemanne maanprogramme ondervind is, het die USSR beduidende sukses behaal met sy operasies op die afgeleë maan en twee historiese eerstes behaal met die outomatiese Lunokhod- en die Luna -monsteropbrengsendings. Die Mars -sondeprogram is ook suksesvol voortgesit, terwyl die verkennings van Venus en daarna die Halley -komeet deur die Venera- en Vega -sondeprogramme meer effektief was.

Die Sowjet -ruimteprogram het inligting oor sy projekte teruggehou voor die sukses van Sputnik, die eerste kunsmatige satelliet ter wêreld. Toe die Sputnik -projek die eerste keer goedgekeur is, was een van die mees onmiddellike optrede wat die Politburo geneem het, om te oorweeg wat hulle aan die wêreld moet bekend maak rakende hul gebeurtenis. Die Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union (TASS) het presedente geskep vir alle amptelike aankondigings oor die Sowjet -ruimteprogram. Die inligting wat uiteindelik bekend gemaak is, het nie besonderhede verskaf oor wie die satelliet gebou en gelanseer het of waarom dit gelanseer is nie. Die openbaarmaking gee egter 'n insig in wat dit wel onthul: "daar is 'n oorvloed wetenskaplike en tegniese gegewens, asof dit die leser met wiskunde wil oorweldig sonder 'n prentjie van die voorwerp". [22] Wat van die vrylating oorbly, is die trots vir die Sowjet -kosmonautika en die vae aanduiding van toekomstige moontlikhede wat dan beskikbaar was na die sukses van Sputnik.

Die gebruik van geheimhouding van die Sowjet -ruimteprogram het gedien as 'n hulpmiddel om die lek van geklassifiseerde inligting tussen lande te voorkom en ook om 'n geheimsinnige versperring tussen die ruimteprogram en die Sowjet -bevolking te skep. Die aard van die program bevat dubbelsinnige boodskappe rakende sy doelwitte, suksesse en waardes. Die program self was so geheim dat 'n gewone Sowjetburger nooit 'n konkrete beeld daarvan kon kry nie, maar eerder 'n oppervlakkige beeld van sy geskiedenis, huidige aktiwiteite of toekomstige pogings. Die bekendstelling is eers bekend gemaak toe dit plaasgevind het. Kosmonaut -name is eers bekend gemaak toe hulle gevlieg het. Missiebesonderhede was yl. Waarnemers buite het nie die grootte of vorm van hul vuurpyle of hutte of die meeste van hul ruimteskepe geken nie, behalwe die eerste Sputniks, maansondes en Venus -sonde. [23]

Die militêre invloed op die Sowjet -ruimteprogram kan egter die beste verklaring vir hierdie geheimhouding wees. Die OKB-1 was ondergeskik aan die Ministerie van Algemene Masjienbou, [22] wat die ontwikkeling van interkontinentale ballistiese missiele moes ondergaan, en het sy bates ewekansige identifiseerders in die 1960's gegee: 'Die Vostok-ruimtetuig is byvoorbeeld genoem' voorwerp IIF63 'terwyl die afvuurraket' voorwerp 8K72K 'was'. [22] Sowjet-verdedigingsfabrieke het sedert 1927 nommers gekry eerder as name. Selfs hierdie interne kodes is verdoesel: in die openbaar gebruik werknemers 'n aparte kode, 'n stel spesiale poskantoornommers, om na die fabrieke, institute en departemente.

Die openbare uitsprake van die program was eenvormig positief: sover die mense weet, het die Sowjet -ruimteprogram nog nooit misluk nie. Volgens historikus James Andrews, "met byna geen uitsonderings nie, het die dekking van Sowjet -ruimte -uitbuiting, veral in die geval van menslike ruimtemissies, berigte oor mislukking of probleme weggelaat". [22]

"Die USSR is deur Winston Churchill beroemd beskryf as ''n raaisel, toegedraai in 'n raaisel' en niks het dit meer beteken as die soeke na die waarheid agter sy ruimteprogram tydens die Koue Oorlog nie. Hoewel die ruimtewedloop letterlik gespeel is bo ons koppe, is dit dikwels verduister deur 'n figuurlike 'ruimtegordyn' wat baie moeite verg om deur te sien "[23] sê Dominic Phelan in die boek Koue Oorlog Ruimteverklarings (Springer-Praxis 2013).


Toe Rusland die ruimtewedloop wen: 'n Koue Oorlog -geskiedenis, in foto's

In 'n dokumentêre film uit 1961 wat Yuri Gagarin se aankoms in Moskou op die lughawe Vnukovo wys na sy heldhaftige missie as die eerste man in die ruimte, word alles sorgvuldig gereël en opgevoer: die rooi tapyt op die teerpad, die skare toeskouers, die Sowjet -leier Nikita Chroesjtsjof wag om hom tuis te verwelkom. Alles is perfek, behalwe vir een detail. Terwyl Gagarin langs die rooi tapyt loop, met alle oë op hom, raak sy skoenveters los.

BOEKRESENSIE “Picturing the Cosmos: A Visual History of Early Soviet Space Endeavour, ” deur Iina Kohonen (Intellect/University of Chicago Press), 205 bladsye. Hierbo 'n portret van die kosmonaut Yuri Gagarin uit 1961 in die tydskrif Ogonyok.

Dit is 'n ewekansige menslike oomblik te midde van 'n noukeurig beplande skouspel. In sy outobiografie beskryf Gagarin later sy gedagtes: “ Wat as ek daarop trap en ek val op die rooi tapyt? Dit sou regtig 'n verleentheid wees. Die mense sal lag - hy val nie uit die ruimte nie, maar val op 'n plat grond en val#8230 ’ ”

Soos Iina Kohonen in haar fassinerende nuwe boek “Picturing the Cosmos: A Visual History of Early Soviet Space Endeavour” uitwys, is Sowjet -media tot in die kleinste besonderhede beheer. Die openbare opvatting van die ruimte -pogings van die moederland was die produk van 'n noukeurig saamgestelde verhaal van Sowjet -triomf en verkenning. Die kosmonaute is beskryf ... as ideale manne, beide fisies en geestelik ... ” skryf Kohonen. Waarom is hierdie ongemaklike knip in die blink pantser van die Sowjet -held nie uit die film geredigeer nie?

Die antwoord toon die belangrikste tesis van Kohonen aan: die belangrikheid en krag van beeldspraak in die ruimtevaart, polities sowel as kultureel, in die Sowjetunie. Die boek ondersoek hoe visuele media 'n oorkoepelende heroïese mite van die oorwinnende Sowjet -mens kon opstel, wat die dieptes van die ruimte dapper ondersoek, tot eer van die USSR en die hele mensdom, en hoe die vertelling gemaak is om die waardes te beklemtoon wat Sowjet -leiers wou hê om hul burgers in te boesem - terwyl hulle ongemaklike realiteite verberg en houdings in stryd met die amptelike lyn voorkom.

'N Kultuurantropoloog en kenner van die visuele geskiedenis van die Sowjet -ruimteprogram, konsentreer Kohonen op die argiewe van die gewilde weeklikse fototydskrif Ogonyok, die Sowjet -ekwivalent van Life. Indien nie altyd valse nuus in die 21ste-eeuse Amerikaanse sin van die term nie, was die beriggewing van tydskrifte soos Ogonyok tegelyk politieke propaganda, sosiale beheer en kollektiewe sielkundige anoniem. Vanuit die oogpunt van die huidige waarnemer ” skryf Kohonen, “ het die materiaal ... die waarheid ingekleur en gewysig, foute bedek, weggesteek en bedrog gelieg. Die beelde wat verband hou met ruimte in die Sowjetunie kan nie as neutrale foto's vir die pers beskou word nie. ”

In plaas daarvan moes die openbare beeld van die ruimtevaarder tot 'n fyn rand van die geïdealiseerde werklikheid geslyp word. Hy was 'n vaste militêre vlieënier, 'n toegewyde gesinsman, 'n toegewyde kommunis. Diegene wat nie aan hierdie ideale voldoen het nie, is van die openbare bestaan ​​verwyder. Oorweeg Grigori Nelyubov, wat moontlik die eerste mens in die ruimte was in plaas van Yuri Gagarin totdat hy uit die kosmonautekorps getrom is vir 'n slegte gedrag. genade. En hoewel vroue vermoedelik volle gelykheid in die kommunistiese samelewing geniet, het die Sowjet -beeldmakers probleme ondervind met die feit dat die vroulike kosmonaut Valentina Tereshkova ongetroud was - ten minste totdat sy uiteindelik met 'n ander ruimtevaarder getroud was. Intussen is Tereshkova se suster -kosmonaute, waarvan niemand ooit gevlieg het nie, nooit afgeneem of aan die publiek blootgestel nie - verborge figure van die Sowjet -ruimteprogram.

Tog kan die werklikheid soms die amptelike mitologie gebruik. Alhoewel ongelukke of mislukkings nie tot die verhaal van die seëvierende ruimteprogram behoort het nie, is dit onmoontlik om ignoreer die dood van reeds gepubliseerde Sowjet-helde, soos Vladimir Komarov, wat in 1967 in 'n herintredingsongeluk gesterf het. Maar die waarheid kan nog steeds beklemtoon word en besonderhede verdoesel word. In Ogonyok is die saak verlig met 'n kort doodsberig, die ongeluk was nie nuus op die voorblad nie, ” sê Kohonen. Die grootste uitsondering was die dood van Yuri Gagarin in 'n vlugopleidingsongeluk in 1968. Maar die mitiese status van Gagarin het ook 'n uitstekende geleentheid gebied om die tragedie maksimaal te benut met 'n uitgebreide staatsbegrafnis. “Even Ogonyok admitted this: Gagarin had been closer to God than anybody else and was therefore a saint,” writes Kohonen.

The cover of Ogonyok in January 1958. The caption reads, “Happy New Year, comrades!”

Visual: From "Picturing the Cosmos" (Intellect Books)

Reality intruded in other ways. Using imagery from its Moon-orbiting Luna 3 probe, the USSR had begun mapping the dark side of the Moon, naming previously unseen lunar features with terminology that was later officially accepted by the International Astronomical Union, the authority in charge of naming all celestial bodies. But this apparent triumph for Soviet science evaporated shortly thereafter, when more detailed imagery (some from the U.S.-manned Apollo missions) proved that two of the biggest findings that the Soviets had so proudly named didn’t actually exist and were only the artifacts of low-resolution photography. “The Soviet Union could not have lost the Moon Race in a more symbolic way,” Kohonen remarks.

The heart of Kohonen’s story in “Picturing the Cosmos: A Visual History of Early Soviet Space Endeavor” is, of course, the fascinating collection of images she has compiled. Some of them may be familiar to dedicated space geeks. But many more will be surprising and fresh, which makes it a shame that most of the 125 images are displayed in such small sizes that it’s often difficult to adequately appreciate the details that Kohonen describes in her analyses. And although each image is referenced in the text by number, some of the references are inaccurate, leading to occasional confusion. Still, the sheer number of images and Kohonen’s astute commentary help compensate for these lapses.

A nd what of Gagarin’s shoelaces? Kohonen shows that it’s a rare example of truth being adopted to serve the heroic narrative. “The shoelaces becoming untied was certainly a mistake, but leaving the detail in the film was not,” she concludes. They were “a happy slip that was taken as part of the story. Through the shoelaces, Gagarin’s humanity, ordinariness, and fallibility were emphasized.”

But other inconvenient truths continued to be excised from public consciousness. Kohonen found the same scene included in a film from the late 60s, years after Khrushchev had been ousted from power. Gagarin’s shoelaces are still untied. But the since disgraced nonperson Khrushchev had been edited out.

Mark Wolverton is a science writer, author, and playwright whose articles have appeared in Undark, Wired, Scientific American, Popular Science, Air & Space Smithsonian, and American Heritage, among other publications. His most recent book is “A Life in Twilight: The Final Years of J. Robert Oppenheimer.” In 2016-17, he was a Knight Science Journalism fellow at MIT.


This Is Why The Soviet Union Lost 'The Space Race' To The USA

Apollo 11 brought humans onto the surface of the Moon for the first time in 1969. Shown here is Buzz . [+] Aldrin setting up the Solar Wind experiment as part of Apollo 11, with Neil Armstrong snapping the photograph. Until 1966, however, the Soviet Union was far ahead in the space race. In just three years, the United States leapfrogged and surpassed them.

Here in the United States and all across the world, humanity is currently celebrating the 50th anniversary of the culmination of the Space Race: the quest to put a human being on the Moon and safely return them to Earth. On July 20, 1969, our species achieved the culmination of a dream older than civilization itself: human beings set foot on the surface of another world beyond Earth.

If any nation was going to do it, most thought it would be the Soviet Union. The Soviets were first to every milestone in space before that: the first satellite, the first crewed spaceflight, the first person to orbit the Earth, the first woman in space, the first spacewalk, the first landers on another world, etc. After the disastrous Apollo 1 fire, it seemed like a foregone conclusion that the Soviets would be the first to walk on the Moon. Yet they never even came close. Hoekom nie? The answer is a name you've probably never heard of: Sergei Korolev. Here's what you should know.

Sergei Korolev, at right, was initially an aerospace pilot and a student of Tsiolkovsky's work . [+] before becoming a rocket and spacecraft designer. He is shown here with designer Boris Cheranovsky near a BICh-8 glider, in a photo from 1929.

Long before humanity ever broke the gravitational bonds of Earth, there were a few scientists working all over the world who pioneered what's now the science of theoretical astronautics. While it had much in common with aeronautics, based on the physics of Newton, there were additional restrictions and concerns that came along with the idea of journeying into space. Unlike with terrestrial flight, journeying into space necessarily meant:

  • needing a fuel source that could propel you in the absence of an atmosphere,
  • the ability to continuously accelerate for long periods of time,
  • materials that would keep humans and equipment safe at all temperatures and pressures achieved during flight,

The Tsiolkovsky rocket equation is required to describe how fast a spacecraft that burns through a . [+] portion of its fuel to create thrust can wind up traveling through the Universe. Having to bring your own fuel on board is a severely limiting factor as far as the speed at which we can travel through intergalactic space.

Skorkmaz at English Wikipedia

In the early days, all of these concerns were mulled over by theorists alone. A few pioneers stand out in the history of the early 20th century: Robert Goddard, who created and launched the first liquid-fueled rocket Robert Esnault-Pelterie, who began designing airplanes and airplane engines but later moved on to rocketry, developing the idea of rocket maneuvering and Hermann Oberth, who built and launched rockets, rocket motors, liquid-fueled rockets, and mentored a young Wernher von Braun.

But before any of them came Konstantin Tsiolkovsky, who was the first to understand the relationship between consumable rocket fuel, mass, thrust, and acceleration. Perhaps more than any other person, Tsiolkovsky's early works influenced the development of spaceflight and space exploration across the globe. And while Goddard was American, Esnault-Pelterie was French, and Oberth was German, Tsiolkovsky lived his entire life in and around Moscow, Russia/USSR.

In the heart of Moscow, there exists a monument to Konstantin Tsiolkovsky, the founding scientist of . [+] modern spaceflight and astronautics. He is memorialized with this statue at the bottom of the monument of the "Conquerors of Space" obelisk in Moscow.

Although Tsiolkovsky died in 1935, his work left a lasting scientific legacy, particularly in Russia. Sergey Korolev was Tsiolkovsky's pioneering experimental counterpart, who dreamed of traveling to Mars and launched, in 1933, the first Soviet liquid-fueled rocket and the first hybrid-fueled rocket. In 1938, he became a victim of Stalin's Great Purge. Korolev was imprisoned in the Gulag, where he languished until 1944.

In the aftermath of World War II, both the USA's and the USSR's space programs were boosted by the addition of captured German scientists. The USA got most of the top German scientists and a slew of V-2 rockets, but the Soviet Union captured many of the German records, including drawings from V-2 production sites, and the influential scientist Helmut Gröttrup. Unlike the USA, though, the legacy of Tsiolkovsky gave the Soviets an initial edge.

Sergei Korolev, shown here in 1961, served many functions in the Soviet space program, including as . [+] the capsule commander from the ground during many of the crewed spaceflights of the 1960s.

This combination ⁠— of German V-2 technology, Tsiolkovsky's theoretical work, and Korolev's brainpower and imagination ⁠— proved an incredible recipe for Soviet success in the venture of space exploration. Korolev's rise upon his release from the Gulag was nothing short of meteoric.

In 1945, he was commissioned as a colonel in the Red Army, where he immediately began work on developing rocket motors. After being decorated with the Badge of Honor later that year, he was brought to Germany to help recover V-2 rocket technology. By 1946, Korolev was put in charge of overseeing a team of many German specialists, including Gröttrup, in the endeavor to develop a national rocket and missile program. Korolev was appointed as chief designer of long-range missiles, where by 1947, his team was launching R-1 rockets: perfect replicas of the German V-2 designs.

The first photogram (1946) of the Earth's curvature, as seen from a human-launched rocket. Die . [+] German V-2 rocket, along with most of the rocket scientists, were brought to the USA after World War II, but the Soviets managed to get their hands on the blueprints and a few scientists and engineers. Contemporaneous with this US-generated image, Korolev's team was building a Russian version of the V-2: the R-1 rocket.

U.S. Military, White Sands Naval Base, New Mexico

Sure, the United States was doing something very similar: launching V-2 rockets from White Sands missile base in New Mexico in the late 1940s, taking full advantage of post-war German technology. But beginning in 1947, the Korolev-led group began working on advancing and improving the design of the Soviet R-1 rockets, leading to greater missile ranges and the implementation of separate-stage payloads, which could easily double as warheads.

By 1949, the Soviets were launching R-2 rockets designed by Korolev, with double the range and improved accuracy over the original V-2 clones, but Korolev was already thinking further. As early as 1947, Korolev had come up with an entirely novel design for an R-3 missile, with a range of 3,000 kilometers: enough to reach England from Moscow.

The first R-1 rocket launched from Russia occurred in September of 1948, from Kapustin Yar. Of the . [+] 12 rockets delivered, nine were launched and seven successfully hit their targets: about on par with the success rates of the German V-2 rockets they were designed to replicate.

The incremental improvements to rocket and missile technology under Korolev accumulated at a staggering pace under Korolev's guidance. By 1957, the Soviets had achieved the first successful test flight of the R-7 Semyorka: the world's first intercontinental ballistic missile. The R-7 was a two-stage rocket with a maximum range of 7,000 kilometers and a payload of 5.4 tons, enough to carry a Soviet nuclear bomb from St. Petersburg to New York City.

These achievements catapulted Korolev to national prominence within the Soviet Union. He was declared fully rehabilitated, and began advocating for using the R-7 to launch a satellite into space, met with utter disinterest from the Communist Party. But when the United States media began discussing the possibilities of investing millions of dollars to launch a satellite, Korolev seized his chance. In less than a month, Sputnik 1 was designed, constructed, and launched.

A technician working on Sputnik 1 in 1957, prior to its launch. After a mere 3 months in space, . [+] Sputnik 1 fell back to Earth due to atmospheric drag, a problem that plagues all low-Earth-orbiting satellites even today.

On October 4, 1957, the space age officially began. Korolev's rockets had brought humanity above the bonds of Earth's gravity and into orbit. While Khrushchev was initially bored with Korolev's rocket launches, the worldwide recognition for his achievements was too large to ignore on the international stage. Less than a month later, Sputnik 2 — six times the mass of Sputnik 1 — was launched, carrying Laika the dog into orbit.

The launch of the complex Sputnik 3, complete with scientific instruments and a primitive recording device, occurred in May of 1958, demonstrating the capabilities of the Soviet space program. But Korolev had his sights on a bigger target: the Moon. Initially desiring to use the R-7 to carry a package there, Korolev modified the rocket's upper stage for use solely in outer space: the first rocket designed for use solely in outer space.

The Soviet rocket R-7 Semyorka, as shown here, had a dual purpose: to serve as an intercontinental . [+] ballistic missile (ICBM) but also to enable the delivery of large-mass payloads to space. Yuri Gagarin's infamous voyager into space came aboard a modified R-7 rocket.

Despite an enormous lack of funding, time pressure, and an inability to test hardware prior to launch, Korolev was determined to launch a payload to the Moon. On January 2, 1959, The Luna 1 mission reached the Moon, but flew past instead of impacting it, which was the intent. (It missed by less than 6,000 kilometers.) On September 14, 1959, Luna 2 succeeded: becoming the first human-made object to arrive on the Moon.

Less than a month later, Luna 3 took the first photograph of the Moon's far side. In the realm of space exploration, the Soviets were achieving new milestones while the United States was forced to play catch-up. Korolev's achievements led the way, with his dreams growing ever larger. He sought to make the first soft landing on the Moon, and had his sights on Mars and Venus as well. But his biggest dream was for human spaceflight, and to bring humans anywhere his rockets could take them.

Russian rocket engineer Sergei Korolev with the cosmonauts that would fly aboard his rockets, as . [+] shown in Crimea, USSR, circa 1960. Korolyov (1907-1966) was the leading Soviet rocket engineer and spacecraft designer during the space race between the Soviet Union and the United States in the 1950s and 1960s. (Fine Art Images/Heritage Images/Getty Images)

Beginning in 1958, Korolev began undertaking design studies for what would become the Soviet Vostok spacecraft: a fully automated capsule capable of holding a human passenger in a space suit. By May of 1960, an uncrewed prototype was launched, orbiting the Earth 64 times before failing re-entry. On August 19, 1960, two dogs, Beika and Streika, were launched into low-Earth orbit and successfully returned, marking the first time a living creature was launched into space and recovered.

On April 12, 1961, Korolev's modified R-7 launched Yuri Gagarin into space: the first human to break the gravitational bonds of Earth, and also the first human to orbit Earth. The additional Vostok flights, under Korolev's watch (he served as the capsule coordinator), included the first inter-spacecraft communications and rendezvous, as well as the first woman cosmonaut: Valentina Tereshkova.

Nikita Khrushchev (right), first secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and cosmonauts Valentina . [+] Tereshkova, Pavel Popovich (center) and Yuri Gagarin at the Lenin Mausoleum during a demonstration dedicated to the successful 1963 space flights of the Vostok-5 (Valery Bykovsky) and Vostok-6 (Valentina Tershkova) spacecraft.

RIA Novosti archive, image #159271 / V. Malyshev / CC-BY-SA 3.0

Korolev then began work on the Voskhod programme, with the ultimate goal of sending multiple astronauts into space and eventually to the Moon. As early as 1961, Korolev began designing a superheavy launch rocket: the N-1, which used an NK-15 liquid fuel engine and was of the same scale as the Saturn V. With the capacity for a three-person crew and the capability of performing a soft landing upon return, the Soviets were poised to take the next step in the Space Race.

On October 12, 1964, a crew of three Soviet cosmonauts — Vladimir Komarov, Boris Yegorov and Konstantin Feoktistov — completed 16 orbits in space aboard Voskhod 1. Five months later, Alexei Leonov, aboard Vostok 2, performed humanity's first spacewalk. The next step was to reach for the Moon, and Korolev was ready. With the 1964 fall of Khrushchev, Korolev was put in sole charge of the crewed space program, with the goal of a lunar landing for October 1967 (the 50th anniversary of the October revolution) seemingly within reach.

Cosmonaut Yuri Gagarin (left) shaking hands with rocket designer Sergei Korolev (right) at baikonur, . [+] just before his flight into space, from April 12, 1961. Although Korolev might not be the household name that Gagarin is, he is universally heralded (by those not named Khrushchev) as the architect and driving force behind the successes of the Soviet crewed space program. (Sovfoto/Universal Images Group via Getty Images)

Korolev began designing the Soyuz spacecraft that would carry crews to the Moon, as well as the Luna vehicles that would land softly on the Moon, plus robotic missions to Mars and Venus. Korolev also sought to fulfill Tsiolkovsky's dream of putting humans on Mars, with plans for closed-loop life support systems, electrical rocket engines, and orbiting space stations to serve as interplanetary launch sites.

But it was not to be: Korolev entered the hospital on January 5, 1966, for what was thought to be routine intestinal surgery. Nine days later, he was dead from colon cancer complications. Without Korolev as the chief designer, everything went downhill quickly for the Soviets. While he was alive, Korolev fended off attempted meddling from designers like Mikhail Yangel, Vladimir Chhelomei, and Valentin Glushko. But the power vacuum that arose after his demise proved catastrophic.

The wreckage of the Soyuz 1 mission included a fire that was so catastrophic that it took multiple . [+] teams and many attempts to extinguish the flaming wreckage. Komarov was killed by multiple blunt force trauma during the catastrophic descent and re-entry.

Vasily Mishin was chosen as Korolev's successor, and disaster immediately followed. The Soviet goals of orbiting the Moon in 1967 and landing on the Moon in 1968 remained unchanged, and Mishin was under pressure to get them there. On April 23, 1967, Soyuz 1 was launched, with Komarov on board: the first crewed flight since the death of Korolev.

Despite 203 design faults reported by project engineers, the launch still occurred, immediately encountering a series of failures. First, one solar panel failed to unfold, leading to inadequate power. Then the orientation detectors malfunctioned, the automatic stabilization system failed, and the launch of Soyuz 2, expected to rendezvous with Soyuz 1, was cancelled due to thunderstorms. Komarov's report on the 13th orbit let to a mission abort 5 orbits (about 7 hours) later, Soyuz 1 fired its retrorockets and re-entered Earth's atmosphere. Due to another defect, the main parachute never unfolded, and Komarov's manually deployed reserve chute became tangled.

The first flight under Korolev's successor had ended in the worst disaster imaginable: the first in-flight fatality of any space program.

The second N-1 rocket that had a launch attempted failed almost immediately, as the primary booster . [+] stage crashed back down onto the launch pad, causing a fantastic and chilling explosion. Here, the second stage ignites in an attempt to escape it was unsuccessful.

RKK Energia / RussianSpaceWeb

Further setbacks suddenly became the norm. Gagarin, the first human in space, was killed in test flight in 1968. Mishin developed a drinking problem, and multiple N-1 rocket failures and explosions plagued 1969. The lone bright spots came in January of 1969, where the rendezvous, docking, and crew transfer of cosmonauts between two Soyuz spacecraft were achieved.

But the death of Korolev, and the mishaps under his successors, are the real reason why the Soviets lost their lead in the space race, and never achieved the goal of landing humans on the Moon. Smaller goals, such as the first robotic rover on the Moon, as well as the first uncrewed landings on Mars and Venus, were achieved by the Soviet space program in the 1970s, but the big prize was already taken. If not for Korolev's unexpected health decline and death, perhaps history would have turned out differently. In the end, a single person can be the difference between success and failure.


Japan

In Japan the University of Tokyo created an Institute of Space and Astronautical Science (ISAS) in 1964. This small group undertook the development of scientific spacecraft and the vehicles needed to launch them, and it launched Japan’s first satellite, Ōsumi, in 1970. In 1981 oversight of ISAS was transferred to the Japanese Ministry of Education. In 1969 the Japanese government founded a National Space Development Agency (NASDA), which subsequently undertook a comprehensive program of space technology and satellite development and built a large launch vehicle, called the H-II, for those satellites. In 2001 both ISAS and NASDA came under the control of the Japanese Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology. In 2003 ISAS, NASDA, and the National Aerospace Laboratory were merged into a new organization, the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA).


Alexei Leonov, first spacewalk

The success in 1964 of the first Voskhod (Dawn) mission with three cosmonauts on board cleared the way for the next challenge for the Soviet program, the first spacewalk. On March 18, 1965, Alexei Leonov, one of the two crewmembers of the Voskhod 2, abandoned his spacecraft for 12 minutes with only his spacesuit for protection. The capsule made a total of 16 trips around the Earth in over 24 hours.

But once again the mission was not without its problems. During his walk, Leonov’s suit swelled up so much that he could not bend his joints, and he barely managed to get back through the hatch when re-entering the spacecraft. With their suits inflated the two cosmonauts could not sit down, which unbalanced the craft on re-entry.

Anders as die Vostok missions in which the crewmembers were ejected from the craft to land by parachute, the Voskhod touched down with its occupants inside. The capsule landed in a thick forest in the Ural Mountains, so frozen and remote that Leonov and his colleague, Pavel Belyayev, had to wait for a rescue party made up of skiers.


The USSR was Ahead of the US in Space Race Until an Unexpected Tragedy

It was April 1967, and Soviet cosmonaut Vladimir Komarov was in a tough position. He was about to be launched into space aboard the Soyuz 1 rocket. Ordinarily, it was an opportunity a cosmonaut would be willing to kill for. But Komarov knew that the Soyuz 1 was likely doomed. The Soyuz mission would be complex, requiring the craft to rendezvous with another craft in orbit to transfer crew by spacewalk before returning to Earth. Even in the best circumstances, it would test the limits of the craft and the cosmonauts. And the Soyuz 1 was hardly the best craft to do it in.

There were already rumors that the Soyuz was in bad shape. The most recent test flight of the craft had been a miserable disaster. A malfunction with the ship&rsquos escape system had triggered a massive explosion on the launch pad, obliterating the craft. Had the test been manned, any cosmonaut on board would have died instantly. It was clear to everyone involved in the launches that the craft wasn&rsquot ready for any sort of mission. But the higher-ups ignored these potential problems and demanded that the launch go forward.

Soviet cosmonauts (Komarov and Yuri Gagarin are standing next to each other on the bottom left of the photo). Wikimedia Commons.

After all, Lenin&rsquos birthday was coming up. And what better way to celebrate than for the communist state he left behind to send a man into space? More importantly, the Soviets were in a race with the Americans to reach the moon. The Space Race had come to embody the entirety of the Cold War, as both sides competed to see which system was more capable of dominating space. So far the Soviets were winning. Yuri Gagarin, a Russian cosmonaut, had been the first man to ever leave the Earth in 1961. Reacting to the Soviet success, the Americans had vowed to put a man on the moon by the end of the decade.

The Soyuz mission was vital to the Soviet plan to beat them there. There could be no delays. The launch was scheduled for April 23, 1967. Komarov was tapped to man the craft, while Gagarin was slated to be the backup pilot. But Gagarin was a national hero. He was a symbol of the success of the communist system. There was no way that any of his superiors would risk his life in a questionable launch. Gagarin knew that. According to a Pravda journalist who claimed to be on the scene, Gagarin tried to muscle his way on to the flight at the last minute.

Yuri Gagarin. Wikimedia Commons.

His motivation, according to former KGB agent Venyamin Russayev who claimed to know Gagarin personally, was to get the flight scrapped and save Komarov&rsquos life. According to Russayev, Komarov and Gagarin were friends, and Komarov had already insisted that Gagarin wasn&rsquot to take his place on the flight. It&rsquos believable given that the two were known to be close. However, some historians have pointed out that this incident was unlikely and that Russayev, in particular, isn&rsquot a reliable source. Like many of the details that people often cite surrounding the case, this incident should be taken with a grain of salt. But whatever else happened on the launch pad, we do know that Komarov eventually boarded the craft and prepared to take off into space.


The USSR Takes the Lead in the Space Race

In early October of 1957, the Soviet Union started the Space Race with a bang, leaving the United States in the dust. Hoe? By sending a 2-foot metal sphere into space.

Of course, it wasn't just a hunk of metal. That sphere had 4 radio antennae ready to provide scientists with information about the Earth's atmosphere and the reaches of space. Let's call that hunk of metal by its proper name: Sputnik, or Elementary Satellite-1.

The United States and the USSR, enmeshed in a bitter standoff nicknamed the Cold War, were always on the lookout for space to edge ahead of the other. In 1957, the USSR took a considerable step ahead and, while the US was embarrassed to find themselves trailing behind their rivals, sometimes the best way to jump start a flagging program is by bringing in some competition. It's interesting to think: Would the U.S. have enjoyed their eventual successes in spacelanding on the moon if the Soviets had not lit a fire under them by taking the first leap into the atmosphere? Would space travel remain a distant dream for long years later, an unfinished project gathering dust on NASA's shelf?

Weighing in at 184 pounds, Sputnik traveled approximately 18,000 miles per hour, orbiting the Earth once every 96 minutes. It was visible to bystanders using binoculars either just before sunrise or after sunset, and the radio signals it sent back to Earth were robust and clear enough to be heard by radio hobbyists outside of Soviet labs. Amateur radio users all over the world tuned in to hear Sputnik beep its way across the sky for the next twenty-two days.

Sputnik's batteries ran out on October 26, and the spherical shell burned up in January 1958, falling back into the Earth's atmosphere after covering nearly 44 million miles in its 3 months in orbit.

Looking back from the perspective of 2014 and our ever-advancing technology, it's easy to claim that Sputnik's actual exploits were insignificant. But everything the Space Race included needs to start somewhere. And as rudimentary as Sputnik may seem in explanation today, it was the height of scientific achievement in its day.


USSR leads the space race - HISTORY

In October 1957, the Soviet Union launched Sputnik 1, the world's first artificial satellite. The 184-pound, 22.5-inch sphere orbited the earth once every 96 minutes. Sputnik transmitted radio signals for 21 days and later burned up in the earth's atmosphere. A second Sputnik, launched in November 1957, carried a dog named Laika. This satellite weighed a thousand pounds.

In December, the United States made its first attempt at a satellite launch. A Navy Vanguard rocket, carrying a payload only one-fortieth the size of Sputnik, lifted a few feet off of its launch pad before falling back to earth. It exploded in a ball or orange flames and black smoke. Premier Khrushchev boasted that "America sleeps under a Soviet moon." Because Sputnik was launched on an intercontinental ballistic missile, Soviet leaders cited it as proof that they could deliver hydrogen bombs at will.

Sputnik's launch meant that the Cold War competition between the Soviet Union and the United States would take place, not only on earth, but also in outer space. Americans, who thought of themselves as the world's technology pacesetters, felt vulnerable a sensation that was reinforced in 1959, when the Soviet Union fired the first rockets to circle the moon and brought back pictures of its dark side. In April 1961, the Soviets launched the first manned spaceship into orbit, piloted by 27-year-old Soviet Cosmonaut Yuri Gagarin. In 1966, the Soviets were the first to land an unmanned vehicle on the moon.

Sputnik led Congress to pass a series of massive federal aid-to-education measures. Science became a priority in schools and universities. Soviet space successes led President John F. Kennedy to tell a joint session of Congress in May 1961 that the United States would land a man on the moon and bring him home by the end of the 1960s.

The U.S. space program passed through several stages. There were six one-man flights in the Mercury program, which expanded from suborbital flights to an orbital mission that lasted more than 34 hours. The Gemini program followed with ten two-man flights, including the first spacewalk and the rendezvous and docking of two spacecraft. One mission lasted 14 days.

Then disaster struck. In January 1967, a fire destroyed a prototype command module, killing the crew of Apollo 1. Four manned flights in late 1968 and early 1969 paved the way for a historic launch of Apollo 11. The launch was witnessed by a million people assembled along Florida's beaches.

At 4:17 p.m. Eastern time, July 20, 1969, astronaut Neil Armstrong announced: "Houston. the Eagle has landed." The landing vehicle had less than a minutes worth of fuel remaining. The astronauts spent only two-and-a-half hours walking on the lunar surface.

Eight years after President Kennedy had called on the United States to land a man on the moon, the mission had been successfully accomplished. A total of 400,000 American employees from 20,000 companies had worked directly on the Apollo program. The cost was $25 billion.

Today, more than half of all Americans are too young to remember that historic mission. At the Johnson Space Center in Houston, a Saturn V rocket--bigger than a 40-story building--lies on the ground. It is not a mockup. It was intended to carry Apollo 18 to the moon. But due to budget cutbacks, the mission was never carried out.


Kyk die video: USSR (Januarie 2022).