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Wat het die Mongoolse Ryk verhinder om na Europa uit te brei?


Volgens die onderstaande kaart het die Mongoolse Ryk 'n redelike omvang bereik en leiers soos Genghis Khan het al hul vyande konsekwent verslaan. Tog het die ryk nooit na Europa of selfs die Baltiese state uitgebrei nie. Wat het hulle verhinder om in te val en te slaag soos byvoorbeeld die Huns?


Drie faktore.

1) Die dood van Ögedei Khan dwing die hordes wat deur Europa onder Subutai stormloop om af te breek en terug te keer dat die Kuraltai 'n opvolger kies. Onderbreek hul swaarverdiende momentum en gee die Europeërs tyd om te hergroepeer, te herstel, te besin en voor te berei, was die deurslaggewende faktor - Talabuga was ook nie die algemene Subutai nie.

2) Hongarye is die einde van die groot Eurasiese steppe - die "see van gras" - wat die Mongoolse logistieke oppergesag gehandhaaf het. Hulle was op kort termyn suksesvol om verowerings buite hierdie gebied na te streef - gewoonlik as gevolg van Chinese en Islamitiese ingenieurswese, waarvan die mede -opsie 'n belangrike faktor in hul sukses was - maar die terugslae het gedoen ontmoeting het plaasgevind weg van die steppe, waar versterkings deur die tienduisende in verwoestende kort volgorde opgeroep kon word. Die Viet en Champa in hul dik oerwoud, die Majapitt en hul thalassokrasie, die Mamluks in die woestynheuwels - almal het geografie as groot bondgenote beskou. So was dit met die Europeërs wat selfs 'n bietjie suksesvol was teen die Mongole.

3) Sommige Europeërs het vinniger as ander aangepas teenoor hul Mongoolse teenstanders. Die Georgiërs amper klop hulle, die Kroate en dan die Serwiërs het gedoen hulle verslaan (maar nie beslissend nie, en Serwië het erkenning gegee aan die heerskappy van die Mongole om te keer dat hulle terugkom) - Bela IV van Hongarye en sy kleinseun, Ladislaus IV, het geneem wat werk, en 'n suksesvolle strategie opgestel om die Golden Horde af te weer toe hulle het teruggekeer.

  • Ontelbare klipkastele op baie verdedigbare plekke, goed toegerus en opgekap met opgeleide en toegeruste magte, wat mekaar kan ondersteun.

  • 'N Verskroeide aarde-strategie wat die indringende leërs van provender en supply ontken.

  • Harrying-taktiek geleen by die Cumans, steppe perdeboogskutters soortgelyk aan die Mongole wat Ladislaus IV verslaan het voor die Golden Horde se aankoms.

Die Mongole kon na willekeur plunder, maar was voortdurend onder aanval. Die Hongare het geweier om 'n beslissende stryd aan hulle te gee totdat die indringers verswak en uitgeput was en in gunstige omstandighede vir die verdedigers, wat wys was in die Mongoolse gevegstaktiek danksy die invloed van die Cumans.

En wat kan meer Europees wees as die Fabian -strategie?


'N Baie belangrike rede was die dood van Genghis Khan, die' maksimum leier 'in 1227. Dit het veroorsaak dat sy Ryk in vier' Khanates '(sien onderkant van die skakel), Rusland (geel), die Midde -Ooste (pers), verdeel is. Sentraal-Asië (rooi) en China-Mongolië (groen) op die kaart hierbo.

Nie een van hierdie entiteite het die mag van die geheel nie. Meer spesifiek, die meeste ryke verloor 'stoom' nadat die stigter sterf omdat hy 'n 'uitskieter' is wat nie een van die erfgename kan herhaal nie. (In die sakewêreld het WalMart baie momentum verloor nadat stigter Sam Walton gesterf het.)


Die dood van Ogedei Khan in Desember 1241 is die mees toegeskrewe rede vir die staking van die inval in Europa. Batu, seun van Jochi, seun van Genghis was die opperbevelvoerder oor die Europese aanval en 'n moontlike kandidaat vir die opvolger van Ogedei. Hy het geweet dat hy minder gunstig was en waarskynlik nooit 'n goeie khan sou wees nie, daarom wou hy voortgaan, maar die meeste van sy generaals het teruggetrek weens hul verpligting om die Kurultai by te woon. Iets om na te dink, is miskien dat Tsubodei inligting van sy geheime agente en/of verkenningsverkenners gekry het dat 'n verdere inval in Duitsland of Italië die meeste van die oorblywende Europese lande koalisies en kruistogte teen hulle sou veroorsaak.


Eerstens, die Mongoolse ryk was versprei oor 'n massiewe landskap, maar hulle het dit nietemin ingehou. Dit verg hoë militêre mag en 'n groot greep van terreur op die volke van die land om daardie groot hoeveelheid verowerde land in daardie moeilike dae te hou. Dit maak nie saak as die Khan van Khans 'n veldtog teen Europa gevoer het nie. Moenie 'n fout maak nie, die Mongole het die landskapsgrootte wat hulle gedoen het, verower vanweë hul listigheid net soveel as hul brutaliteit. Ons leef moontlik in 'n BAIE ander wêreld as Obedai Khan nie gesterf het nie en die Kurultai gedwing het om 'n nuwe opvolger te kies. Subutai het die begin van hul veldtog in Europa begin en het Rusland reeds verdryf en hul magte vermoor, dapper alhoewel hulle tot byna die laaste man geveg het.


Die Litouwers het die verspreiding van die Golden Horde (en Islam) in Europa verhinder; hulle het Oekraïne (Kiev) bevry tydens die Slag van Blue Waters (1362), wat die agteruitgang van die Westerse invloedsfeer van die Mongoolse Ryk versnel het. Hulle kon nooit weer die streek herwin nie.


In kort,

  1. Die Mongoolse leër kan 'n stad verower, maar kan nie behoorlik daar sit nie, omdat hulle minder troepe vergelyk het met die lande wat hulle gekry het.

  2. Ordentlike hertogte en generaals is teruggeroep om die troon te verslaan; Hulle was ook tuis siek en niemand wil in 'n vreemde land met verskillende kulture bly nie.


Een veronderstelling is dat 'Duitsers' van Europa na die Ooste binnegeval het en saam met die Mongoolse Horde saamgesmelt het in die totale uitwissing van Bagdad. Daar is blykbaar baie in Islamitiese geskiedenis geskryf oor 'n 'aanval op die land uit die Weste' in samewerking met die leërs uit die Ooste as die rede vir die uitwissing van Bagdad. My verstand is dat die Poolse leërs wel by die Mongole betrokke was "ter verdediging van Europa", maar ook vernietig is. Wat die nedersettings betref, het die Golden Horde nie verder gegaan as die Krim nie, waar hulle 'n massiewe vesting gebou het om te voorkom dat indringers uit die Weste toeslaan.

Die vestings en die slawehandel wat algemeen op die Krim voorkom, het daarna eeue lank geduur.


1) Afstand-Die Mongole kon slegs 'n relatief klein hoeveelheid krag na Europa voorgehou het. Ja, hulle kan 'n groot aantal Mongole stuur, maar hul bondgenote wat uit China marsjeer, sou 'n ander saak gewees het, en hul verbintenisse met hul hart sou die hoeveelheid krag wat hulle kon projekteer, beperk.

2) Logistiek-die Mongoolse hordes het baie gras nodig, so volgehoue ​​veldtogte was moeilik. Uitbreiding na Wes -Europa sou allerhande probleme gehad het.

3) Sosiale struktuur-Die Mongole het eenvoudig geen effektiewe manier om 'n uitgestrekte ryk te beheer en te beheer nie, en enige projeksie sou net 'n avontuur wees sonder werklike ondersteuning. Om terug te keer na die ooste omdat 'n leier sterf, toon die gebrek aan 'n werklike struktuur om groot ryke te regeer. Sonder 'n goed omskrewe en georganiseerde struktuur was die Mongoolse ryk besig om uitmekaar te skei voordat dit klaar geskep is.

4) Die Mongole was nie heeltemal die onoorwinlike krag wat hulle dikwels gemaak het nie. Die belangrikste faktor in die Mongoolse verowering van China was dat China verdeeld was en dat daar plaaslike bondgenote was wat bereid was om saam met die Mongole saam te werk om China met behulp van die Mongole self te verower.

5) Die feodale struktuur van Europa het dit redelik bestand gemaak teen verowering. Met ryke is dit maklik om die kop af te kap en die res is lankal gewoond aan onderdanigheid. Met 'n feodale struktuur was elke klein heer onafhanklik, nie gewoond daaraan om hul eie konings te gehoorsaam nie, en lankal opstandig.


Uitbreiding van die Mongoolse Ryk onder Ögedei

Ögedei, die derde seun van Genghis Khan, het by sy pa oorgeneem en vanaf 1227 CE-1241 CE die Mongoolse Ryk regeer. Een van sy belangrikste bydraes tot die ryk was sy verowering van Oos -Europa. Hierdie verowerings behels invalle van Rusland, Hongarye, Wolga -Bulgarye, Pole, Dalmatië en Wallachia. In die loop van vier jaar (1237–1241) het die Mongole die meeste van die groot Oos -Europese stede vinnig ingehaal, maar het Novgorod en Pskov net gespaar. As gevolg van die suksesvolle invalle sou baie van die verowerde gebiede deel word van die Mongoolse Ryk. Daar word soms na hierdie verowerde gebied verwys as die Golden Horde.

“ Coronation of Ögedei ” 1229, deur Rashid al-Din.

Die operasies is onder leiding van generaal Subutai en onder bevel van Batu Khan en Kadan, albei kleinseuns van Genghis Khan. Die Mongole het Chinese buskruit aangeskaf, wat hulle tydens die inval in Europa in groot stryd ontplooi het tot groot sukses, in die vorm van bomme wat deur katapulte gewerp is. Die Mongole het die eer gekry dat hulle kruit en gepaardgaande wapens in Europa ingebring het. Hulle was ook meesters in kavallerie -invalle en belegoorloë, wat baie van die owerhede wat die Mongole gehoop het, bedreig het.


Waarom het die Mongoolse Ryk die verdere uitbreiding na Europa gestaak ná Ogedei se dood?

Titel. Dit maak nie vir my sin dat die verowering skielik tot 'n einde sou kom na die dood van 'n leier nie, aangesien die dood van Genghis Khan nie die verowerings van die Mongole gestuit het nie.

As ek reg onthou, uit die hardcore geskiedenis, het Genghis Khan seker gemaak dat Ogodei hom sou opvolg. Ogodei sterf egter vroeg aan alkoholisme, en die Mongoolse wet sou die generaals terugbring en besluit wie die volgende leier sou wees. Aangesien ogodei geen bevoegde opvolger gehad het nie (of ek meervoudige kinders, het ek vergeet), het die opvolgingsgeskil buite beheer gerol.

Die uitstekende Wrath of the Khans -reeks kan hier op die Hardcore History -webwerf gevind word of deur in iTunes / u gunsteling podcast -app te soek. Dit werk baie goed om diep te duik in die verspreiding van die Mongoolse Ryk en die opvolgingskwessies na Genghis Khan en Ögedei Khan.

Dit klink soos een van my speletjies van Crusader Kings II.

Omdat Batu en die res van die altun moes haastig terug Karakorum toe en politiek speel. Dit was vir hulle belangriker as hul avontuur in die Weste.

Onthou, toe Temujin sterf, was die opvolging reeds vasgestel en het almal daarmee saamgegaan. Maar toe Ogodai sterf, was dit skielik op die spel. Hy was 'n toegewyde alkoholis, en dit was meestal wat hom doodgemaak het. As hy daarin geslaag het om van sy laaste siekte (die laaste van 'n lang opvolging) te herstel en nog vyf of ses jaar te leef, sou die Mongole heel moontlik aan die kus van Frankryk beland het en bote gebou het vir die inval in Engeland.

Ek lees 'n fassinerende argument dat die Mongole nie maklik buite Hongarye sou gewees het nie, want daar was geen groot weivelde om hulle perde te laat wei nie.

Die Mongoolse oorlogsmasjien was afhanklik van 'n groot hoeveelheid perde. Elke Mongoolse kryger het veelvuldige remounts wat hom na die geveg sou vergesel, en wat bygedra het tot die veelbewoë Mongoolse mobiliteit, al hierdie remounts sou groot hoeveelhede weiveld nodig hê om gevoer te word en die laaste stukkie Eurasiese steppe eindig in Hongarye. Die ander groot steppemense soos die Magjars, die Huns en dies meer het almal in Hongarye beland en het om dieselfde rede nie veel verder gevorder nie (hulle het beslis toegeslaan, maar hulle het hul gebiede buite Hongarye nie direk gehou nie). Sirië/Palestina (die plek waar die beroemde Mongoolse nederlaag by Ain Jalut was) was ook 'n ander geval waar die Mongole nie dieselfde magte kon opbou nie weens 'n gebrek aan weiveld.

Nou was die Mongole beslis aanpasbaar. Suid -China was 'n ander plek wat vreeslik was vir kavalerie -gebaseerde oorlogvoering, maar hulle het 'n vloot ontwikkel en dit na ongeveer 150 jaar verower. Hulle sou beslis Europa kon inneem, maar hulle sou moes aanpas en dit sou nie 'n wandeling in die park gewees het nie

Goed, die geskiedenis van die Mongole is net aan my verkoop met hierdie stelling & quotMongole sou heel moontlik aan die kus van Frankryk beland het en bote gebou het vir die inval in Engeland & quot.

Wat het ek in die geskiedenis misgeloop? Is daar 'n definitiewe boek waarmee ek moet begin as ek die geskiedenis van die Mongole wil lees?

Daarbenewens sê sommige berigte dat die Mongole relatief onbeïndruk was met die rykdom van Oos -Europa. Nadat hulle die koninkryke van China, Sentraal -Asië en die Midde -Ooste verower het, was hulle gewoond aan 'n sekere buit en skat wat die Europeërs destyds nog nie gehad het nie. Die ruggraat van hul beleid was afhanklik van minder bestuur en swaarder belasting in die vorm van goedere as huldeblyk aan die Khan. Geen regte goedere, geen inval nie.

Dieselfde gebeur met die verowering van die lied, toe Mongke in 1259 weens slegte weer sterf, en Kublai moes terugjaag om die opvolging te wen, en dan moes hy nog jare spandeer om sy nuutgevonde krag te konsolideer voordat hy die werk in China kon voltooi 20 jaar later.

Mongole bou bote. Amusante gedagte.

Negatief, hulle kon nie in Europa veg nie, want hulle was gewoond aan die steppe wat oor Eurasië strek. Europa is te bergagtig en beboste.

Ek hou nie van hierdie verhaal nie, want dit het die verkeerde indruk gewek dat die Mongoolse Ryk 'n enkele entiteit was wat in staat was om 'n enkele doel te bereik, in teenstelling met 'n bondgenoot van kibbelende klein khanate wat al hoe meer tyd bestee het teen mekaar terwyl hulle ouer word.

Die verowering van Sung is uitgevoer deur 'n enkele entiteit in die konfederate: die huis van Tului. Die Jochian en Chagataian khanates het niks daarmee te doen gehad nie en sou waarskynlik geen ondersteuning gebied het nie, selfs al sou hulle dit gevra word. Die veldtog van die broer van Kublai - Hulagu na Mesopotamië het hom vyandskap opgelewer eerder as ondersteuning van Chagataian en Jochian khanates.

Die een eenvoudige antwoord waarom die Mongole by die poort van Europa gestop het: politiek.

Hier word bespiegel dat die Mongole eintlik huursoldate was wat deur die Venesiaanse bankdinastieë gehuur is, om hulle monopolie oor die Silk Road te beheer. As daar die waarheid is, sou die staking in Europa minder te doen gehad het met die dood van 'n leier en meer te doen het met die 'kwotasie'.

Vreemd genoeg in militêre terme, is daar slegs 'n paar verskillende soorte weermag. Die basiese beginsels is: Ligte infanterie, swaar infanterie, ligte kavallerie en swaar kavallerie. Elkeen het sy teller en in die geskiedenis was dit wat kon aangevoer word. Om ligte kavallerie teen te werk, het u ideaal 'n mengsel van vier dinge. Ligte infanterie in die vorm van boogskutters, versterkings en swaar infanterie as 'n teenperdmag. Dan kan u 'n ligte kavallerie meng vir teistering.

In moderne terme, dink aan ligte bomwerpers/helikopters as die Mongoolse kavalerie, hulle kan vinnig inbeweeg en die onvoorbereide baie verwoes. Maar hulle kan net grond inneem en vashou as daar geen gereedheid is om die land terug te neem nie, op die oomblik dat die vyand 'n leër kan ontbloot.

Om 'n moderne vloot ligte bomwerpers te verslaan, gebruik u 'n kombinasie van oppervlak om missiele (boogskutters), versterkings te lug en dit met vegvliegtuie te teister. Dan het u ligte en swaar infanterie nodig om besetting te voorkom.

'N Ander faktor dat hulle nie meer Europa kon binnedring nie, was dat die Europeërs dit geweet het. Hulle bou dus gereeld groot vestings vir hul boogskutters om enige Mongoolse leërs ernstig te kon beseer, en saam met ander versterkings in die omgewing kon hulle ligte kavallerie uitstuur om die Mongole wat teëgestaan ​​het, te teister. Die Mongole sou dus 'n werklike probleem ondervind om 'n beleg te kry, aangesien dit nie iets was waarmee hulle baie goed was nie, en om op een plek te bly, was moeilik vir 'n ligte infanterie wat voortdurend geteister word. Hulle beleërsukses het gewoonlik behels dat hulle net in 'n enkele stad rondbeweeg en dit uitgehonger het. Dit kan die moeite werd wees vir 'n groot stad, maar nie vir 'n handvol versterkings nie.

Terwyl Europa dus nooit 'n leër bymekaargemaak het om die Mongole aan te pak nie, het dit baie vinnig vir die Mongole te moeilik geword om terug te kom en deur te vee.

Ek sou vermoed dat, nadat die Mongole 'n bietjie teruggekry het, hulle verkenners en spioene sou gestuur het om te ontdek hoe moeilik dit gaan wees. Miskien kon hulle aanhou om na die Europeërs te gooi en te wen, maar dit sou hulle moontlik kwesbaar gemaak het vir probleme in Suid -China. Boonop sou Europa op daardie tydstip nie so 'n groot prys gelyk het nie.

'N Ander interessante aspek is dat die ridder amper heeltemal nutteloos is teenoor die mongole. Dit is waar die verskillende militêre tipes elk hul tellers het. Ligte kavalerie is die perfekte teenstander van die swaar kavallerie. In teorie kan 'n enkele Mongool 'n onbeperkte aantal ridders verslaan. Die Mongool kan net uit hul pad bly terwyl hulle met pyle na hulle spring. Dan sal daar na 'n rukkie geen ridders meer wees nie en 'n Mongool met 'n moeë boogarm. 'N Gepantserde ridder word die beste gebruik teen ligte infanterie. Hulle donder in en maai die boogskutters en liggewapende soldate neer. Die teller teen ridders is swaar infanterie met lang snoeke wat formasies van boogskutters verdedig in kombinasie met teisterende ligte kavallerie.


Troebel opvolgings

Die dood van Ogedai in 1241 het gelei tot opvolgingstryd, 'n patroon vir die ryk van toe af. Genghis het vier seuns gehad, Jochi, Chagatai, Ogedai en Tolui. Nadat Ogedai gesterf het, het sy weduwee geworstel om haar seun, Guyuk, as khan verkies te kry. Guyuk was egter swak en sterf na slegs twee jaar. Gedurende die volgende paar jaar het Sorkhaqtani, die weduwee van Tolui, gewerk om die ryk bymekaar te hou tot die verkiesing van Mongke Khan, Tolui se seun. Die ryk het uitgebrei na Bulgarye, Oos -Europa en Irak in die weste en na Viëtnam in die ooste.

Die broer van Mongke, Halagu, het Bagdad verslaan en beset. Kublai, broer van Mongke en Halagu, het veldtog gevoer in Song, die suidelike deelstaat China. In 1260, na die dood van Mongke, beweer Kublai en Ariqboke, 'n ander broer, albei dat hulle Great Khan is. 'N Opvolgingsoorlog het gevolg, wat Kublai uiteindelik in 1264 gewen het. Teen hierdie tyd verswak die groot Mongoolse Ryk.


Die invloed van die Mongoolse Ryk

Gedurende die dertiende en veertiende eeu het handel gedy onder die heerskappy van mans wat as stam, nomadiese barbare ontstaan ​​het. Hulle vakbond het 'n toename in ekonomiese welvaart en respek teenoor handelaars begin. Hulle het baie gebiede beïnvloed wat oor verskillende terreine strek. Die Mongoolse Ryk het 'n ongekende handelsnetwerk in Eurasië geskep en die ekonomie van die gebiede wat dit verower het, positief beïnvloed.

Die opkoms van die Mongoolse Ryk het toegeneem met 'n tyd van verwoesting en wanorde in Eurasië. Terwyl hulle begin saamgaan het, het die nomadiese barbare uit die steppe die plaaslike bevolking wreed behandel deur stede op die grond te plunder en af ​​te brand. Sa'di, 'n Persiese digter wat gedurende hierdie tyd gelewe het, het geskryf: 'Na die inval van die Mongole het die wêreld net so deurmekaar gelyk soos die hare van 'n Ethiopiër. Mans was soos wolwe. ” Maar hierdie tydperk van vernietiging kan ook bestempel word as georganiseerde territoriale uitbreiding. Die vernietiging van stede of bevolkings wat geweier het om oor te gee, was 'een van die meer suksesvolle taktieke wat die Mongole gebruik', omdat dit onwrikbare krag sowel as barmhartigheid en toegeeflikheid toon vir diegene wat verkies het om Mongoolse verowering toe te laat. “Benewens die intimidasie -taktiek, is die vinnige uitbreiding van die Ryk ook vergemaklik deur militêre gehardheid (veral gedurende bitter koue winters), militêre vaardigheid, meritokrasie en dissipline.”

Genghis Khan was 'n man wat die nomadiese stamme van die Mongoolse plato verenig het en voortgegaan het om groot stukke Sentraal-Asië en China te verower, wat die mees uitgebreide landgebaseerde ryk tot nog toe geskep het. Hy het sy manne georganiseer en nuwe komplekse militêre strategieë ontwikkel, soos beleëringsoorlogvoering, terugtrekking deur 'n vinger en 'n uitgebreide kavallerie. Die Mongole het ook Chinese ingenieurs gevange geneem en beleërmotors gebou wat aanvalle gehelp het wat deur stadsmure of versterkings moes gaan. Hulle metodes om grondgebied te verkry, was slegs effektief en menslik teenoor hul eie leër. Mongoolse administrasie het 'n stelsel van voorraadverdeling ingestel waarmee elke afdeling genoeg was om hulle tydens hul verowerings te hou. Die historikus Mary Hull skryf:

. . . Hulle was 'n formidabele gesig. Elke trommel ['n weermag -eenheid van 10 000 soldate] was toegerus met pakperde wat met ekstra toerusting en wapens agter die geledere geloop het. Aan die agterkant van die weermag, agter die beleg van enjins en reservate, was die belangrikste bagagetrein van kamele en waens gelaai met voorrade en toerusting. Volledig saamgestelde tente, mobiele yurts, is ook op karre gedra. Na die waens was die troppe skape en bokke wat kos en melk vir die weermag verskaf het.

Die organisasie van die Mongole toe hulle een van die grootste landryke in die geskiedenis begin vorm het, word gekenmerk deur felheid en die gebruik van innoverende militêre taktieke.

Terwyl die Mongole mense verower het, het hulle die Silk Road oorgeneem en dit verander in 'n verenigde handelsroete van kulturele verspreiding en assimilasie. Die Mongole "het hul handels- en handelsverhoudinge met naburige ekonomieë waardeer" en het die eerste ryk geskep wat die meerderheid van Eurasië verenig het. Hulle teenwoordigheid in China was veral invloedryk, aangesien dit die Chinese en hul tradisionele maniere kultuur geskok het. In China was handelaars onderaan die Chinese hiërargie, maar toe die Mongole oorneem, word handelaars baie hoog geag. Die Mongole het ook ontslae geraak van die "konfiskerende belasting" wat die handelaars gedurende baie Chinese dinastieë moes trotseer. 'N Ander verandering wat die Mongole gemaak het, was die stigting van handelsverenigings, genaamd Ortoghs. Dit het handelaars in staat gestel om 'hul hulpbronne saam te voeg om 'n enkele karavaan te ondersteun', verliese, risiko's en winste sou tussen al die betrokke handelaars gedeel word en 'geen enkele handelaar sou uit die sak kom nie'. Handelaars wat by 'n Ortogh betrokke was, kwalifiseer ook vir lenings deur die Mongole. Tydens die Yuan -dinastie het die Mongole ook die hoeveelheid papiergeld in omloop verhoog en die waarde van daardie papiergeld in edelmetale gewaarborg.

Al hierdie veranderinge en verbeterings het nie net handel vergemaklik nie, maar het ook soveel ekonomiese voorspoed en vrede geskep dat historici hierdie tyd nou as die Pax Mongolië beskou. John Masson Smith Jr., professor aan die Universiteit van Kalifornië, Berkeley, het 'n opstel geskryf met die titel "The Mongols and the Silk Road", vol voorbeelde van die voorspoedige tye van die Pax Mongolica en die kulturele uitruilings wat aan die Silk Road plaasgevind het. . Hy het geskryf:

Chinese wewers is na Samarkand gestuur om met die plaaslike Moslemwewers saam te werk, en Moslemwewers wat spesialiste in goud was, is na China gebring. Ryk Mongole belê in hierdie ondernemings en in die verkoop van hul produkte en vorm kommersiële verenigings (ortaqs) met handelaars wat ervaring het met vervoer oor die Silk Road. . . Sulke Mongole kan ook sorg dat hul handelsvennote die geriewe van die jam gebruik om voedsel, vars diere en verblyf vir hul woonwaens te bekom. In die eeu, ongeveer, van die Mongoolse bewind in Eurasië, floreer die sypad soos nog nooit tevore nie.

Saam met die goeie wat oor die Silk Road gekom het, was die slegte. Per ongeluk was die Mongole ook die bron van 'n nuwe golf van epidemies wat in die veertiende eeu deur 'n groot deel van Europa gespoel het. Die Swart Dood het sy oorsprong in Asië en versprei oor die Silk Road na Europa, waar dit die bevolking verwoes en ekonomiese ontbering veroorsaak het. Dit toon die sterk en komplekse netwerk wat die Mongole tussen Asië en Europa geskep het.

Die gebiede wat die Mongole verower en by hul ryk gevoeg het, het drasties verskil, maar dit het die Mongole nie gekeer om beheer te verkry en hul bewind toe te pas nie. Die mees fundamentele gebied waaroor die Mongole beheer gekry het, was China tydens die Song -dinastie. Kublai Khan wou China verower en die Song -dinastie om drie redes verslaan. Eerstens was die land in die suide van China baie meer bewerkbaar as die land in die noorde, wat reeds onder Mongoolse beheer was. Kublai Khan wou hierdie gebied verower om die voedselproduksie van die ryk te verhoog. 'N Tweede rede was dat die kushawe van China baie waardevol was. Hulle sou die ryk se buitelandse handel verhoog en die rykdom van die ryk vergroot. Kublai Khan was ook bevrees vir militêre opstand uit die Song as hy nie beheer daaroor sou kry nie. Die Mongole het die administratiewe stelsel dieselfde gelaat, maar het wel 'n paar veranderinge binne die ryk aangebring. Kublai Khan het byvoorbeeld 'n posdiensstelsel ingestel wat doeltreffende inligtingverskuiwing moontlik gemaak het en rusplekke vir reisigers en handelaars bied. Hulle het ook baie paaie gebou, wat hoofsaaklik gebruik is om 'die Mongoolse heerskappy oor China te vergemaklik'.

'N Ander gebied wat die Mongole verower en beïnvloed het, was die hedendaagse Iran. Historikus George Lane skryf: "Die vestiging van die Il-Khanate-dinastie in Iran in die middel van die dertiende eeu ontken alle mites en verhale van onuitwisbare Mongoolse barbaarsheid en hul heerskappy as 'n klad op 'n antieke beskawing en geskiedenis." Hy bespreek ook hoe hierdie tyd ''n periode van Iraanse kulturele herlewing was'. Die positiewe veranderinge wat die Mongole in die gebiede gebring het waaroor hulle beheer gekry het, is talryk. In Persië, onder die Mongole, het handelaars hoër belastingaftrekkings en voordele gekry in 'n poging om 'handel te bevorder'. Dit toon hoe die Mongole daarna gestreef het om 'bykomende hulp aan handelaars te verleen'. Verder noord, het die Golden Horde se hoofstad, Sarai, floreer en gedy onder Mongoolse bewind. Die beroemde ontdekkingsreisiger, Ibn Battuta, het geskryf: 'Die stad al-Sara [Sarai] is een van die beste stede, van onbeperkte grootte. . . versmoor van die skare van sy inwoners en beskik oor goeie basaars en breë strate. ” Hierdie voorbeelde beklemtoon die prestasies van die Mongoolse Ryk en hul vermoë om territoriale uitbreiding met ekonomiese welvaart te volg.

Gedurende die dertiende en veertiende eeu was daar 'n tyd van gevorderde netwerk en vooruitstrewende handel oor die hele Eurasië, waarvan baie deur die Mongoolse Ryk vergemaklik is. Die Mongole was nie net godsdienstig verdraagsaam nie, maar kon ook die verskille van ander kulture aanvaar en met hul eie assimileer. Soos Genghis Khan, die Groot Khan, gesê het: "Wees eensgesind en een geloof, sodat u u vyande kan oorwin en 'n lang en gelukkige lewe kan lei."

Sara Gannon is 'n junior aan die hoërskool Clayton A. Bouton en die poësie -redakteur van die Blackbird Review. Sy geniet dit om akademies te skryf vir die skool en kreatief in haar vrye tyd.


Mongoolse Ryk: Chormaquan en die Mongoolse verowering van die Midde -Ooste

Dit was 1246, en 'n Franciskaanse monnik met die naam John de Plano Carpini, die pouslike gesant na die Mongoolse hof in Karakorum, het baie aandagtig na 'n paar Russiese priesters gaan luister by die kroning van Güyük Khan. Carpini se verstand het elke detail opgeneem terwyl die Russiese priesters gepraat het oor die verowerings van die Mongole en die name en liggings van die Mongoolse generaals voorgehou het. En toe hulle klaar was met praat, het Carpini 'n wonderlike ding bereik wat Hy meer intelligensie versamel het as wat die hele Christendom ooit geweet het oor hierdie geheimsinnige, skrikwekkende ruiters uit die ooste.

Van die Russiese priesters het hy verneem van veral een generaal genaamd Chormaqan wat teen die lande in die Midde -Ooste getrek het, en nie net mans nie, maar ook ware monsters verslaan het. Carpini het later geskryf dat toe Chormaqan 'n woestyn oorsteek, hy op sekere monsters afkom, sodat ons 'n sekere waarheid is, wat 'n menslike vorm het, maar slegs een arm met 'n hand, in die middel van die bors en een voet, en hulle twee het met een boog geskiet en hulle het so vinnig gehardloop dat perde nie op hul baan kon bly nie, want hulle het gehardloop deur op hul een voet te spring, en toe hulle moeg word vir hierdie metode van vordering, het oor die hand gekom en die wiele draai met die voet. Toe dit hulle uitgeput het, hardloop hulle weer op hul vorige manier. ’ Die Russiese priesters het ook aan Carpini gesê dat Chormaqan, nadat hulle hulle verslaan het, verskeie van die monsters na Karakorum gestuur het om vrede te vra.

Die monsters was moontlik 'n mite, maar die Mongoolse generaal van die verhaal het inderdaad bestaan. Chormaqan Noyan het min van die roem behaal wat sy eweknieë, soos Subedei, Muqali en Bayan, verwerf het. Maar dit is nie 'n gebrek aan prestasie nie. Die meerderheid van die besittings van die Mongoolse ryk in die Midde-Ooste is verkry tydens die tien jaar lange veldtog van Chormaqan, maar die meeste historici van die Mongoolse verowerings is geneig om hul aandag op die invalle van China en Europa te vestig.

Die eerste vermelding van Chormaqan was tydens die Mongoolse inval in die Khwarazmiese ryk in 1219-1221. Op 'n stadium in 1221 kon die seuns van Genghis Khan, Jochi, Chaghatai en Ogedei, nadat hulle die stad Urgench afgedank het, nie 'n deel van die buit vir hul pa opsy sit nie. Dit het die groot khan baie kwaad gemaak. Terwyl sy seuns skugter voor die groot Mongoolse leier sit, berispe hy hulle oor hul gretigheid en ongehoorsaamheid. Min mense durf openlik met Genghis Khan praat tydens sy woede-oomblikke, maar drie kokerdraers van die keshik, of keiserlike lyfwag, ingegryp. Die drie lede, Qongqai, Qongtaqar en Chormaqan, het 'n versoekskrif aan Genghis Khan gedoen en gesê: Net soos grys valke wat pas begin oefen het, leer die seuns skaars hoe om 'n militêre veldtog te voer, en dan bestraf u hulle in sulke 'n manier om die seuns moedeloos te ontmoedig. Hoekom? Ons is bang dat die seuns, wat bang is, moed sal verloor ’.

Die toon van moed en wysheid het die groot khan beïndruk. Alhoewel Chormaqan en sy mede -wagters 'n blaaskans vir die drie prinse gekry het, het hulle ook iets vir hulself gesoek. Hulle het versoek dat Genghis Khan hulle sou toelaat om 'n aanval op Bagdad, wat destyds buite die Mongoolse koninkryk gelê het, te lei. Genghis Khan het dit kortliks oorweeg en daarna Chormaqan -bevordering toegestaan ​​om die veldtog te lei, terwyl Qongqai en Qongtaqar in die keshik.

Chormaqan Noyan, 'n lid van die Sunit -stam van die Mongole, het dus 'n generaal geword. Tog sou sy leër nege jaar wag voordat hy uiteindelik sou uittrek. Verskeie faktore het die veldtog uitgestel. Die eerste probleem wat opgelos is, was nog 'n oorlog en 'n weerbarstige vasal. Die oorlog het uitgebreek nadat Inaljuq, die Khwarazmiaanse goewerneur van Otrar, 'n Mongoolse beskermde karavaan geslag het en daarna Mongoolse gesante doodgemaak het toe hulle vergoeding vir die verontwaardiging geëis het. Genghis Khan, wat reeds 'n veldtog teen die Jurchen -koninkryk in die noorde van China gehad het, het vinnig 'n ander leër bymekaargemaak om teen sy nuwe teenstander te beweeg. Iluqu Burkhan, heerser van die Tangut -koninkryk Hsi Hsia, was egter ongehoorsaam aan die groot bevel van Khan om troepe vir die Khwarazmiese veldtog te stuur en sy ambassadeur het dit selfs gewaag om te sê: As die magte van Genghis Khan nie ander kan onderwerp nie, waarom het hy so ver gegaan as om khan te word? ’ Omdat gevegte nog steeds in China aan die gang was, kon Genghis Khan die mans nie spaar om die Tangut te onderwerp nie. Rather than to let the Khwarazmians go unpunished, Genghis Khan invaded their land and set aside his plans to deal with his rebellious vassal for a later date.

After destroying the Khwarazmian empire, Genghis Khan was free to move against Hsi Hsia in 1226. The Mongol armies quickly laid the kingdom to waste, but before the capital city of Ninghsia, the Mongol war machine stalled and a lengthy siege began. Genghis Khan personally led the campaign, but while hunting, the old warrior’s horse was startled and threw him from the saddle. Though seemingly uninjured at first, Genghis Khan slowly grew weaker and weaker, probably from internal injuries. He died in 1227, while the siege of Ninghsia was still going on. His last order was for the king of Hsi Hsia and the population of Ninghsia to be slaughtered. Ultimately the city fell and his last request was carried out. It is not certain if Chormaqan was present during this campaign, but with Genghis Khan’s death, no Mongol general could begin a new campaign until they had elected a new khan at the imperial capital of Karakorum. Genghis Khan’s chosen successor, Ogedei, one of his four principal sons, was not enthroned until 1229. It was not until 1230, when Sultan Jalal al-Din, an old nemesis of the Mongols, returned to revive Khwarazmian power in Persia, that Chormaqan finally got his marching orders.

Jalal al-Din had defeated Mongol forces on several occasions during the war of 1219-1221. After suffering a defeat by an army personally led by Genghis Khan, however, Jalal al-Din was forced to flee. In 1226, however, he returned to Persia to revive the empire lost by his father, Muhammad ‘Ala al-Din II. The Mongol forces sent against him in 1227 were defeated at Dameghan. Another army that marched against Jalal al-Din scored a pyrrhic victory in the vicinity of Isfahan, but was unable to follow up that success.

Believing himself to be safe from further Mongol threat, Jalal al-Din tried to carve a new kingdom out of Iraq al-Jami and the Transcaucasia region. However, in Rum, now part of Turkey, he was defeated by Sultan Ashraf of Aleppo and the Seljuk Sultan ‘Ala al-Din of Rum. An envoy of the Ismaili Assassins of Persia came to Bukhara, where Chormaqan was stationed, and informed him of that setback, which revealed Jalal al-Din’s weakness. With this information in hand and Ogedei’s consent to launch a campaign at last, Chormaqan left Bukhara at the head of 30 to 50,000 Mongol soldiers. Many of his lieutenants were commanders who had fought against Jalal al-Din in 1227 and 1228.

The Mongol army mainly consisted of lightly armored but heavily armed horse-archers. The majority of the officers were ethnic Mongols, however, many of the rank and file were various Turkic nomads who had become Mongol vassals. In addition to the light cavalry, there was a contingent of heavy cavalrymen who carried lances as well as the composite bow favored by the Mongols. With a range of almost 300 yards, the composite bow allowed the Mongols to fight a battle of concentrated firepower, rather than a whirling melee of blades. Furthermore, each Mongol trooper had a string of three to five horses that were trained to live off the land rather than fodder or grain. This allowed the Mongols to maintain their seemingly indefatigable mobility. When one horse became weary, the trooper simply switched horses.

Chormaqan did not immediately set out against Jalal al-Din. Instead, he occupied Persia and Khurasan, two long-standing bases of Khwarazmian support. Crossing the Amu Darya River in 1230 and entering Kurasan without encountering any opposition, Chormaqan passed through it quickly. He left a sizable contingent behind under the command of Dayir Noyan, who had further instructions to invade western Afghanistan. Chormaqan and the majority of his army then entered the northern section of Persia known as Mazandaran in the autumn of 1230. In doing so, he avoided the mountainous area south of the Caspian Sea. That region was controlled by the Ismailis, Shi’ite Muslims known in the West as Assassins. In providing Chormaqan with intelligence on Jalal al-Din’s location, they purchased a respite from the Mongol advance.

Upon reaching the city of Rai, Chormaqan made his winter camp there and dispatched his armies to pacify the rest of northern Persia. In 1231, he led his army southward and quickly captured the cities of Qum and Hamadan. From there, he sent armies into the regions of Fars and Kirman, whose rulers quickly submitted, preferring to pay tribute to their Mongol overlords rather than to see their states ravaged. Meanwhile further east, Dayir steadily achieved his goals in capturing Kabul, Ghaznin, and Zawulistan.

At that point, only one major stronghold in Persia, remained outside of Mongol control. This was Isfahan, where Jalal al-Din once turned over 400 Mongol prisoners to the populace to be tortured and executed. After Chormaqan discovered that it could not be quickly taken, he left a strong contingent to lay siege to it. With that obstacle neutralized, he then renewed his advance westward.

The conquest of Persia was achieved without the interference of its would-be defender. Jalal al-Din, although a great warrior, was more of a freebooter than a king. Once the Mongols invaded Persia, he tried to strike alliances with many of his former enemies. He sent emissaries to Caliph al-Nasir in Baghdad, to the Ayyubid sultan Ashraf in Aleppo, and to the Seljuk Turk sultan, ‘Ala al-Din. ‘If I am removed, you cannot resist them,’ he wrote in desperation. ‘I am to you as the Wall of Alexander. Let each one of you send a detachment with a standard to support me, and when the news of our accord and agreement reaches them, their teeth will be blunted and our army in good heart’.

Neither of the sultans nor the caliph were swayed by those words. Jalal al-Din had angered too many people during his reign. The enmity between the Abbasid caliphs and the Khwarazmian sultans harkened back to the reign of Jalal al-Din’s father. There were even rumors that the caliph himself had written to Genghis Khan, asking for assistance against the Khwarazmian Empire. As for Sultan Ashraf and Sultan ‘Ala al-Din, they had recently defeated Jalal al-Din after he had encroached upon their territories. They were eager to see him removed.

With the Mongols already in control of Persia, Jalal al-Din was isolated in Transcaucasia, whose citizens neither loved nor respected him. What he controlled was strictly through brute force, yet for all of his braggadocio and prowess, Jalal al-Din was terrified of the approaching Mongols. When he received a Mongol envoy and learned of Chormaqan’s strength, he promptly executed the ambassador for fear that his men would learn how outnumbered they were.

At no point did Jalal al-Din seek a battle with the Mongols once their army crossed the Amu Darya, but that did not discourage Chormaqan. Since the sultan would not come to meet him, he sent a force to pursue the sultan, while the rest of his army subjugated Persia.

Jalal al-Din wintered in 1230 in the lush pastures of the Mughan plain. He did not expect the Mongols, who wintered at Rai, to advance against him. He quickly learned his mistake when he received reports that Mongol forces were seen near Zinjan, a mere hundred miles from his camp. Once they reached the city of Sarab, Jalal al-Din decided to retreat further north. Only five days later, the Mongols reached his new camp and attacked, but the frantic Jalal al-Din managed to elude his pursuers. When his men returned to his headquarters to report the Khwarazmian sultan’s narrow escape, Chormaquan was furious. According to the historian Juvaini, Chormaqan asked his officers, ‘At the very moment when such an enemy had lost his strength and the veils of concealment had fallen from him, how could they then give him respite and slacken the search?’

After that, Chormaqan assigned one of his lieutenants, Taimas, with the specific mission of hunting down Jalal al-Din. In 1231, Taimas led his forces into the Mughan plain and then into Arran. Jalal al-Din tried to elude his pursuers by fleeing north towards Shirvan and then southward towards Azerbaijan. Taimas did not recklessly pursue his quarry, but took the time to establish Mongol domination in parts of Arran. Thus Jalal al-Din’s kingdom shrank further and another base of support, the vital pastures of the Mughan Plain, were cut off to the sultan. Jalal al-Din fled to the city of Ganjak but again that provided only a short respite. When Taimas’ soldiers approached, the sultan fled through Kurdistan to the city of Akhlat. There he was able to throw his pursuers off his trail, but instead of withdrawing, Taimas advanced north to Manzikert. Jalal al-Din took the opportunity to lead the remainder of his forces to Amid, where he tried to forge another alliance. As with all of his previous diplomatic overtures, he failed.

It was now winter and Jalal al-Din did not believe that the Mongols would continue their hunt until spring. Thus he dispersed his primarily mounted army, so that the available pasturage could accommodate its horses. He also sent out subordinates to report on the Mongols’ whereabouts and relaxed considerably when they reported that the Mongols had returned to Iraq and Persia. Later, when he heard that Mongol troopers were sighted within the vicinity, he dismissed it as merely a rumor. ne night, while Jalal al-Din’s camp was recovering from an evening of debauchery, Taimas’ forces struck. Again Jalal al-Din managed to escape amid the confusion, this time only because the Mongols saw one of his commanders, Orkhon, riding away with the sultan’s banner, and mistook him for Jalal-al-Din himself. That oversight was quickly rectified as another force pursued Jalal al-Din into the Sufaye Mountains. They lost the Khwarazmian sultan, but he did not escape unscathed. While he rode alone, Kurdish brigands slew him for his clothing in the winter of 1231.

Meanwhile, the Mongols did not cease in their attacks on the remaining Khwarazmian forces. The Mongol contingent that had followed Jalal al-Din raided the environs of Akhlat and Erjish. Other units departed southward towards Mardin, Nusaybin, and Khabur. Others even descended upon Irbil before returning to Persia.

While Taimas hunted the Khwarazmian sultan, Chormaqan continued to expand Mongol control into the region. In 1231, he sent an army against the city of Maragha on the eastern side of Lake Urmiya. It resisted and suffered a similar fate to that meted out to other cities that did so-once it fell, its inhabitants were massacred.

Isfahan remained the only Persian city holding out against the Mongols, but it was isolated. Meanwhile, Chormaqan had achieved several goals by sending Taimas to pursue the elusive Jalal al-Din. Keeping the sultan on the move prevented him from rallying support. Second, Taimas established Mongol domination in some of the regions he passed through, preventing Jalal al-Din from circling back and reducing his territory with each passing day. Taimas’ pursuit also disrupted other regions through which he rode, not taking the time to conquer them, but leaving them more susceptible to later Mongol attacks.

With Jalal al-Din removed and Persia firmly under Mongol control, Chormaqan moved the army into the Mughan plain in 1233. After resting his forces for a year and allowing the herds that accompanied the Mongol armies to regain their strength, he renewed his offensive. In the winter of 1234, Chormaqan led his army across the Araxes River into Arran toward Ganjak. Despite a valiant resistance, Ganjak’s walls were breached by catapult and battering ram in 1235.

At the same time, another Mongol army laid siege to Irbil. Although the city fell to the Mongols and much of its populace was massacred, the citadel continued to hold out. The Mongols eventually withdrew after the citizens of Irbil agreed to send a yearly tribute to the court of the khan.

Chormaqan then gathered his commanders in a quriltai or council to discuss the rest of the campaign in Armenia and Georgia. After they established specific targets, Chormaqan divided his army into several columns. Thus the Armenian and Georgian forces would not be able to concentrate their forces, as it would leave other regions vulnerable to the Mongol flying columns. Rather than launch his renewed campaign immediately, Chormaqan waited until 1238, when the forces of Batu and Subedei were also active to the north in the Kipchak steppe against nomadic tribes and the Russian principalities.

Once the appointed time of invasion arrived, five separate columns, consisting of three major corps and two smaller divisions, moved out. One column, led by Mular, struck into the Kura River valley. Chormaqan led his army into Armenia, while the third major column invaded Georgia under the command of Chaghatai Noyan. The two smaller contingents, led by Jula and Yissaur, rode into regions of Arran and eastern Armenia.

In 1238, Chaghatai Noyan and his lieutenant, Toghta Noyan, captured Lorhe whose ruler, Shahanshah, fled with his family before the Mongols arrived, leaving the rich city to its fate. Toghta then led a division against Gaian, ruled by Prince Avak. Gaian was a fortress of considerable strength. Toghta ruled out a direct assault and had his men construct a wall around it, while opening negotiations with the prince. Surprisingly, when supplies ran short in the castle, the Mongols displayed clemency and allowed many of the besieged to leave unharmed. Eventually Avak surrendered and was sent to Chormaqan’s headquarters, then located on the northwestern shore of Lake Sevan.

Toghta Noyan then reunited with his superior, Chaghatai Noyan. Together they proceeded to capture Dumanise and Shamshvilde before moving against Tiflis, the capital of Georgia. Tiflis’ fortifications had been razed by Jalal al-Din several years earlier and the city was still indefensible. Upon the Mongols’ approach Georgia’s ruler, Queen Rusudan, fled to the west, leaving an individual named Goj in charge with orders that ‘if the enemy appeared, to set fire to Tiflis, except the palace and the quarter called Isann.’ Goj, however, panicked and burned the entire city. As Chaghatai’s forces moved up the Kura River more and more Georgian nobles asked Rusudan’s permission to submit. The queen, though safe in the fortress of Kutaise, granted it, preferring to spare her subjects from further devastation.

While he completed his conquest of Georgia, Chormaqan received Prince Avak at his camp by Lake Sevan and accepted his surrender on the condition that he provide tribute and also participate in the campaign against his countrymen. Avak immediately agreed, since to refuse would surely have meant execution. In 1239 Chormaqan, accompanied by Avak, marched southward towards the Armenian capital, Ani.

Before the army arrived, Chormaqan sent envoys ahead to demand the city’s surrender. The city elders, however, pleaded that they could not surrender the city without the permission of their ruler, Shahanshah, who was already in flight after the sack of Lorhe. Days passed as they awaited word from their ruler and the populace grew increasingly agitated. It was not long before a mob seized the envoys and killed them-an unforgivable offense according to Mongol custom. The city’s fate was now sealed.

Chormaqan ordered the assault to begin. Using concentrated fire from numerous catapults, the walls were breached. Even after the city surrendered, the citizens were divided and then massacred.

The neighboring city of Kars quickly sent its submission to Chormaqan after hearing the fate of Ani. Chormaqan, however, was in no mood for clemency, ordering an assault that quickly captured the city. Chormaqan had no intention of laying waste the entire country, however. Once the conquest was complete, he issued orders to the people to return to their homes and live in peace.

While Chormaqan subdued Armenia north of the Araxes River, Mular invaded central Armenia. In 1239 his forces invaded the district of Shamkor, the realm of Prince Vahram. Prince Vahram had an opportunity to stop Mular’s vanguard, but he did nothing and waited in his fortress.

Upon arriving at Shamkor, Mular found his path blocked by a deep ditch that surrounded the city. He ordered his men to fill it with fascines. When the defenders burned them, Mular directed his men to fill their deels, or the long Mongol robes, with dirt and empty them into the ditch. In that manner, the ditch was filled and the Mongols soon breached the walls. The population of Shamkor paid for its valiant resistance by being massacred.

From Shamkor, Mular stormed and seized Prince Vahram’s other strongholds one by one-Tuerakan, Ergevank, Tavush, Kac’apet, Kavazin, Gag, and Mac’naberd all were taken by storm. Ghataghan, Mular’s lieutenant captured Gardman, Charek, Kedabek, and Varsanshod. With the complete subjugation of his kingdom, Prince Vahram had no option but to submit to the Mongols in 1239.

One of the smaller forces, led by Chormaqan’s brother Jula, invaded the Karabagh region. After ravaging the countryside, he seized Khatchen in 1238. After a putting up a spirited defense at Hohanaberd, the city’s ruler, Hasan Jalal, submitted to Jula. The Mongol general, apparently impressed by Hasan Jalal’s defense, accepted the surrender and in turn increased his territory. From that point, Hasan Jelal’s was spared from further attacks, under the conditions that he paid tribute and took part in other campaigns in western Asia alongside the Mongols.

The fifth and final corps of the Mongol army, led by Yissaur Noyan, surrounded Hrashkaberd, ruled by Prince Ulikum Orbelean, in 1238. Yissaur soon realized that he would not be able to take the city by force and resorted to diplomacy. Sending emissaries to Orbelean, Yissaur presented two clear options-surrender or starve. Prince Orbelean accepted the surrender terms and was rewarded with many gifts and appointment as a general in the Mongol forces.

By 1240, Chormaqan had completed the conquest of Transcaucasia. These lands would later be the basis of the later Mongol Il-Khanate. Although the Mongols massacred many cities, they also accepted the surrender of several princes. These would later join the Mongols in future campaigns against neighboring Muslim powers, such as the caliphate in Baghdad, the Seljuk Turks, and the many Ayyubid principalities in Syria.

Chormaqan did not overrun the kingdoms he invaded with an irresistible wave of barbarians, but through the slow, steady reduction of resistance. In Transcaucasia, the Mongols never met their opponents in open combat, but faced long arduous sieges in mountainous and hilly terrain. By choosing the summer months to campaign, as opposed to the winter months, when the Mongols usually did so, Chormaqan put the defenders at a weaker position. The summers are dry and the harvests were not in. Many of the fortresses the Mongols not captured due to any deficiencies on the part of their defenders, but due to thirst and hunger. By using several columns, he prevented the Armenians and Georgians from uniting. He further promoted discord by using those princes who submitted through negotiation, or by granting them territory for their services.

A few later Armenian chroniclers attributed the Mongol victory to divine intervention. According to Grigor of Akanc, ‘The wise princes of Armenia and Georgia realized that God was giving power and victory to them to take our countries, thus they became obedient to the Tat’ars, and agreed to give them tribute known as mal and t’agar and to come out to them with their cavalry where ever they led them.’ The truth, however, was that Chormaqan had conquered a vast amount of territory for the Mongol empire through a well-thought-out, systematic campaign worthy of history’s finest strategists.

The conquest of Armenia and Georgia marked the end of Chormaqan’s brilliant military career. He remained the military governor of Transcaucasia, though Persia gradually passed under a civil administration. According even to the conquered, he proved to be an able and fair governor. Yet, he lived only two years after completing his conquests. Later in 1240, Chormaqan suffered a stroke that robbed him of the ability to speak and left him paralyzed. His wife, Altan Khatun, ruled in his stead until he died in 1241.

To fill those positions Genghis Khan commanded that the eldest sons of his commanders of thousands come with 10 companions and a younger brother, and that the commanders of hundred-man units should send their eldest sons and five companions and a younger brother. Finally the commanders of 10 sent their eldest son, three companions, and a younger brother. The common people were not excluded from the keshik. They too could send their sons to join under the same guidelines as the commanders of 10. From that pool, Genghis Khan chose the best warriors. That arrangement gave everyone an opportunity to serve in the keshik, but it also provided the khan with hostages so that he could keep his commanders in check, should the need arise.

Timothy M. May writes from Stoughton, Wisconsin. He is a Ph. D. candidate at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, writes from Stoughton, Wis. For further reading, he recommends Rene Grousset’s The Empire of the Steppes ‘Ala al-Din Juvaini’s The History of the World Conqueror and David Morgan’s The Mongols.

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The Pax Mongolica

The Pax Mongolica ushered in an era of stability and commerce that successfully connected Europe and East Asia.

Geography, Social Studies, World History

Genghis Khan

Genghis Khan is the most famous ruler in all of Mongolia's history. Khan's empire occupied a large piece of modern day Asia, including most of China.

The Pax Mongolica, Latin for &ldquoMongol peace,&rdquo describes a period of relative stability in Eurasia under the Mongol Empire during the 13th and 14th centuries. The Pax Mongolica brought a period of stability among the people who lived in the conquered territory.

After the death of the first Mongol emperor, Genghis Khan, in 1227, the resulting empire extended from the China&rsquos Pacific coast to Eastern Europe. This meant that the Silk Road network, which had been dangerous to travel due to the warring kingdoms along the route, fell completely under Mongol control.

The resulting stability brought by Mongol rule opened these ancient trade routes to a largely undisturbed exchange of goods between peoples from Europe to East Asia. Along the Silk Road, people traded goods such as horses, porcelain, jewels, silk, paper, and gun powder. European travelers, such as the Venetian merchant Marco Polo, were able to go all the way to China and back. Polo went on to describe his experience in distant lands in a chronicle that captivated the European audience.

Aside from facilitating trade, the Mongol influence also improved the communication along the Silk Road by establishing a postal relay system. The Mongols culturally enhanced the Silk Road by allowing people of different religions to coexist. The merging of peoples and cultures from conquered territories brought religious freedom throughout the empire. Across the vast steppes of Asia, a traveler might encounter Muslims and Christians living and working alongside Mongols, who continued to practice their traditional religion.

But some of the things that made the Pax Mongolica so efficient are what caused its decline and fall in the mid-1300s. The efficient trade routes led to the rapid and unchecked spread of the bubonic plague, also known as the Black Death. The plague originated in central Asia, making its way westward to Europe where it spread further. In addition to disease, the fragmented empire endured increasing turmoil from within. This prevented further expansion and hastened its inevitable decline.

Genghis Khan is the most famous ruler in all of Mongolia's history. Khan's empire occupied a large piece of modern day Asia, including most of China.


How Poles and Hungarians Turned Back the Mongol Horde and Saved Europe

In the midst of worries about the Wuhan coronavirus, it is worth remembering that the scholarly consensus has long been that the Black Plague reached the Mediterranean in 1347 because of the Mongol invasion of Crimea. The Mongol Empire and its derivative kingdoms were, themselves, considered plagues at the time. Some modern historians celebrate Mongol religious tolerance — historian Jack Weatherford has called its capital city Karakorum “the most religiously open and tolerant city in the world at that time” [1] — but the rest of the world, whether Muslim, Christian, or Hindu, viewed the Mongols as devils.

Arguably the worst Mongol savagery was in 1258, when Hulagu Khan and his Ilkhanate Empire (along with allies from the Christian states of the Armenian Kingdom of Cilicia, the Kingdom of Georgia, and the Principality of Antioch) destroyed Baghdad, thus ending the so-called “Islamic Golden Age.” The Mongols raped and pillaged for days, destroyed the city’s libraries and universities, and murdered at least 3,000 of the city’s notables. The Mongol destruction of Baghdad was far worse for the Muslim world than the Crusades Muslims flourished in the Crusader states after the fall of Jerusalem in 1099.

The Mongols did not spare Europe. The horsemen from Central Asia invaded at a time when the formerly great state of Kievan Rus’ was fractured. On May 31, 1223, a Mongol army of approximately 20,000 defeated an alliance of Russian princes at the Battle of Kalka River, when the principalities and duchies were already exhausted after years of civil war.

Battle of the Kalka River

Mongols then raided and laid siege to all the major settlements in Russia and Ukraine. In 1237, a Mongol army burned Moscow to the ground. Three years later, Mongols took Kiev, thus conquering all Kievan Rus’ territory [2]. The “Tatar yoke” of Russia lasted until 1480, and is often invoked to explain why Russia is so culturally different from the rest of Europe. Mongol occupation may have frozen Russia in time and kept it from developing along Western European lines.

Then in 1241, the Mongols invaded the Kingdom of Hungary. The Hungarians and their allies should have had an advantage. King Bela IV had military support from his subjects in Transylvania, the Kingdom of Croatia, the Duchy of Austria, and several Catholic military orders, such as the Knights Templar and the Teutonic Knights. The Cumans, a Turkic people originally from the area north of the Black Sea, moved into Hungary because of heavy Mongol taxation and agreed to serve them, and with good reason — Batu Khan, the grandson of Genghis Khan, invaded Hungary with the intent of exterminating the Cumans [3].

The decisive engagement was the Battle of Mohi in April 1241. By mid-March, 50,000 Mongol soldiers had crossed the Carpathian Mountains into Hungary, and the battle began near the Sajo River on April 11th. Subutai Khan surprised the Hungarians by using catapults to launch not only stones but ordinance that was new to Europeans: balls of flaming tar and Chinese exploding shells. By seven that morning, the Mongols had already routed the Hungarians and their allies. However, the day seemed to turn when the Mongols began retreating. This was the famous Mongol tactic of feigned retreat, and after forcing the pursuing Europeans into a funnel, Subtai’s men cut them down. Between 40,000 and 60,000 Hungarian, Croatian, and Austrian soldiers died in the battle [4].

Burial site where the Battle of Mohi took place. [Credit Image: Sebastian.mrozek via Wikimedia]

Two days before the Battle of Mohi, the Mongols had crushed a Christian army of Polish, German, Moravian, and Templar soldiers at the Battle of Legnica. Contemporaries considered these two defeats akin to a “biblical plague” [5]. But luck spared both the Polish and Hungarian Kingdoms from Mongol subjugation — in 1242, dynastic infighting in Central Asia led to the “Golden Horde” leaving the area, despite their impressive victories.

However, the Mongols returned in 1259, when Generals Berke Khan and Burundai Khan, and an army of approximately 20,000 Mongol cavalrymen and 10,000 Ruthenian foot soldiers invaded Poland once again. Booty was the primary object of this invasion, but it was also part of a plan to punish Poland for giving shelter to Prince Daniel of Galicia-Volhynia (modern-day Ukraine, Poland, Belarus, and Slovakia), who had declared independence from the Golden Horde in 1253.

Burundai Khan forced Daniel into exile in Poland. Mongols crowned Daniel’s brother Vasilko and his son Leo/Lev as the new rulers of Galicia and Volhynia, and destroyed the fortifications Daniel had built in Ruthenia (western Ukraine). The Khan’s army then marched into Poland, sacked every settlement along the Vistula River, and laid siege to the city of Sandomierz. On the fourth day of the siege, the city’s citizens sought refuge in a church but were slaughtered along with 48 Dominican monks. Burundai’s army later invaded Lithuania and raided the Teutonic Knights in Prussia. They made off with booty and slaves before returning to Russia to fight yet another dynastic civil war.

After that, Central Europe was spared Mongol wrath until 1285. Three years earlier, the Cuman Turks in the Kingdom of Hungary had revolted against King Ladislaus IV because of tensions between the pagan Cumans and the Christian Hungarians. The king defeated the Cumans at Lake Hod in 1282, but the survivors fled into the lands of the Golden Horde, where they then persuaded Nogai Khan to invade Hungary.

Van die Chronicum Pictum in Hungary’s National Library. The dismounted Mongols, with captured women, are on the left, the Hungarians, with one saved woman, on the right.

The second Mongol invasion of Hungary was much smaller than the first. Nogai’s army attacked the settlements along the Danube River for loot, not for conquest. Because the Cumans told Nogai about Ladislaus’s poor relations with his barons, Nogai probably thought he could easily defeat the Hungarians. Hy was verkeerd. First, the Polish Duke Leszek II kept King Leo I of Galicia-Volhynia from invading Hungary as part of the Golden Horde’s coalition. Nogai and Talabuga Khan managed to reach Buda and Pest, but their attacks failed because they did not bring siege equipment. Also, during the 1240s, Hungary had increased its number of baronies. This meant Nogai and Talabuga constantly ran into small defensive forces recruited from individual Hungarian counties. These militias were tough and durable, and one from Sáros County defeated Nogai’s troops and sent many severed heads to King Ladislaus. The king’s army then chased the defeated Mongols all the way into the Carpathian Mountains, where they were trapped by bad weather and harassed by a peasant insurgency.

When Nogai and Talabuga invaded Poland a third time in late 1287, they were defeated by a combined Polish-Hungarian force led by Duke Leszek. Regardless, Nogai’s Golden Horde still continued to raid Europe in the following years, and in the 1290s, his army forced Serbia to accept vassalage. They converted to Islam in the 14th century, and Mongol raids became infused with the fervor of jihad. The Golden Horde, which had an alliance with the Byzantine Empire thanks to Toqta Khan’s marriage to an illegitimate Byzantine princess, became the preeminent power in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus region. Despite the alliance, Mongol armies raided Byzantine territory several times in the 1300s, and in a final Mongol invasion of Poland in the 1340s, forced King Casimir III the Great to become a vassal.

Ultimately, the 14h century saw Mongol power wain in Europe and Asia. Constant infighting led to a fractured empire. Some states fared better than others. The Mongol-led Yuan Dynasty in China and Mongolia was replaced by the non-Mongol Han Ming Dynasty in 1368. The Turco-Mongol and Muslim Ilkhanate collapsed in the 1350s after being ravaged by the Black Death and several internal rebellions. The Golden Horde limped all the way into the early 16th century in Russia, but successive Muscovite princes managed to win back Mongol territory slowly but surely.

While the victories of the Hungarians and Poles in the 13th century did not stop the growth of Mongol power in Eastern Europe, they did check Mongol expansion into Central Europe. Much like the later heroism of King John III Sobieski against the Ottomans at Vienna in 1683, the Poles and Hungarians proved their might as Christian warriors against a foreign force. They did the same many times, especially during the subsequent lengthy wars against the Ottoman Turks. We owe a special debt of gratitude to the brave knights and foot soldiers who defended Central Europe and the West from the Golden Horde.

[1]: Jack Weatherford, Genghis Khan and the Making of the Modern World (New York: Three Rivers Press, 2004): 135.

[2]: Russia at War: From the Mongol Conquest to Afghanistan, Chechnya, and Beyond (Two Volumes), edited by Timothy C. Dowling (Santa Barbara, Denver & Oxford: ABC-CLIO, 2015): 979.

[3]: William Urban, The Teutonic Knights: A Military History (Barnsley, South Yorkshire: Frontline, 2018): 37.

[4]: Jason Cummins, History’s Great Untold Stories: Obscure Events of Lasting Importance (Millers Point NSW: Murdoch Books Australia, 2006): 44.

[5]: William Urban. The Teutonic Knights: A Military History, Greenhill Books, 2006, p. 39.


What stopped Muslim expansion into Western Europe?

If we want to think to the causes, we can note that in Western Europe the early Middle Ages saw the construction of Barbarian - Christian powers with good tech and high military attitude. This didn't happen in the territories of the Eastern Roman Empire and the Byzantine power wasn't that "aggressive" and expansive as the Barbarian kingdoms.

Without the Crusades [run by groups of nobles, Kings, the Pope and whatever else] the Eastern Empire would haven't enjoyed a couple of centuries of decreased pressure by Muslim powers. It was so weak that a handful of Western nobles conquered it [creating the feudal Eastern Latin Empire].

The Franks, and the Western in general, ["Franji" as the Arabs called them] demonstrated to be militarily superior to the Muslim armies. Glad nie. At least until XIII century the confrontation was a mismatch.

The "Reconquista" of the Spanish lands was an other clear evidence of this.

Ichon

Civil wars and outside invasions of Islamic territory drew most of their attention away from Europe. Also Europe appears to have gone through some economic/climactic problems which reduced populations and combined with Viking raids, Magyar attacks, and Islamic raids around Mediterranean led to organization of centralized powers strong enough to oppose the few coherent Muslim attempts at conquest.

Emperor of All the Romans

There were several reasons Islam failed to penetrate into Western Europe successfully.

1. The resurgence of the Byzantine empire under Basil I and the Macedonian dynasty he founded.

2. The existence of Khazaria on the steppe as a buffer state.

3. The rise of the Franks in the west.

4. Civil wars and divisions within the Caliphate.

Also, as a note, under Suleiman the Magnificent ottoman armies invaded Central Europe, but were defeated at Vienna.

Domen

Saving from becoming more enlightened and from living in a tolerant state, you mean?

In terms of being overrated, for sure.

But in reality internal problems in Spain hampered the Muslim expansion into France, not the battle of Tours:

It also should be noted, that the Arab incursion in 732 was a plundering raid, not an invasion aimed at conquering land. So the battle of Tours only prevented the Arabs from plundering several regions and capturing several thousands of prisoners. It had no other importance.

BTW - people mention Tours 732 all the time, forgetting about Constantinople 673 - 677, 717 - 718 and Akroinon 740.

Also the battle of Covadonga in 722 - which halted Muslim expansion in Northern Spain - is being forgotten for no reason.

Actually it was Covadonga in 722 which was another version of Thermopylae, considering the legendary ratio of forces.

According to some Medieval sources, at Covadonga 300 (where do we know this from?) Asturian knights defeated 187,000 Muslim warriors.

Casualties were 289 Asturian knights and 124,000 Muslim warriors (the remaining 63,000 escaped, frightened by 11 surviving knights).

But neither of those battles really ended the Arab expansion in the Mediterranean area - they continued to gain new lands durng the 9th century (conquest of Sicily 827 - 902, conquest of Sardinia 720 - 725, Balearic Islands 798, Crete 826 - 827, capture of Rome in 846).

During the 9th century, under the Aghlabid Dynasty, the Arabs captured many strongholds in Italy, Provence and even in the Alps.

So the peak of Arab expansion into Europe was actually around one hundred years daarna the battle of Tours.


How Climate Change Drove the Rise of Genghis Khan

I n the late 1100s, the Mongol tribes were split by dissension, a threat to no one but themselves. By the early decades of the 1200s, the tribes had become a united force that rained havoc on its neighbors, expanding in every direction on a wave of horses. Eventually the Mongols would establish the largest land empire in history, ruling over modern Korea, China, Russia, eastern Europe, southeast Asia, Persia, India and parts of the Middle East. To this day the DNA of the Mongols can be found throughout the territories that once made up their empire.

The difference was Genghis Khan, the warlord who united the tribes and launched them on their wave of unstoppable conquest. But the Mongol Empire wasn’t solely the product of Genghis&rsquos will. As a fascinating new study in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Science (PNAS) demonstrates, the rise of the Mongols may have owed just as much to beneficial changes in the climate that made the grasslands of the Mongol steppes green and verdant, fueling the horses that were the backbone of the empire&rsquos military. Climate change helped make the Mongol Empire possible.

Die PNAS study came from research done by the tree-ring scientists Neil Pederson at Columbia University&rsquos Lamont-Doherty Earth Observatory and Amy Hessl at West Virginia University. On a research trip to Mongolia in 2010, Pederson, Hessl and their colleagues discovered a stand of stunted Siberian pine trees in the Khangai Mountains. The trees&mdashsome of which were still alive&mdashwere ancient, some more than 1,100 years old. Old trees provide a living history book of the climate. During warm, wet years, the trees grow more, and the rings inside the trunk that mark those years are wider. The opposite happens during dry years, when the rings would be narrow.

Counting back to the late 1100s, just before the rise of Genghis Khan, the tree-ring data indicated that the Mongol steppes had been in the grip of an intense drought, one that could have helped drive the years of division among the Mongol tribes as they competed for scarce resources. But the tree-rings showed that the years between 1211 and 1225&mdasha period of time that coincided with the meteoric rise of Genghis Khan, who died in 1227&mdashwere marked by unusually heavy rainfall and mild temperatures. It didn&rsquot turn Mongolia’s harsh steppes into Maui, but the warmer climate would have stimulated the growth of the grasslands that fed the Mongols&rsquo vital herds of horses and livestock. Given that each Mongol warrior had five or more horses, the energy represented by that additional grass would have helped fuel their astounding rate of expansion.

As Hessl put it in a statement:

The transition from extreme drought to extreme moisture right then strongly suggests that climate played a role in human events. It wasn’t the only thing, but it must have created the ideal conditions for a charismatic leader to emerge out of the chaos, develop an army and concentrate power. Where it’s arid, unusual moisture creates unusual plant productivity, and that translates into horsepower. Genghis was literally able to ride that wave.

Of course, climate change was hardly the only factor in the Mongols&rsquo wave of conquest. Genghis used that supply of horses to form the greatest cavalry force the world had yet seen, one capable of rolling over opposing militaries. But it seems likely that he benefited from that unusual bout of climate change, just as civilizations ranging from the Anasazi in the American Southwest to the Angkor in Southeast Asia were likely laid low by shifts in climate that led to sudden, devastating drought.

In recent decades Mongolia&rsquos climate has been changing even faster than in the rest of the world, with temperatures in parts of the country rising by as much as 4.5 F over the past 40 years. At the same time, the country has been hit by severe summer droughts followed by a dzud, or a long, harsh winter. The same tree rings that revealed the climactic history of the Mongol empire show that the most recent drought, from 2002 to 2009, compares in its severity only to those dry periods in the late 1100s. The droughts and the dzuds have killed millions of animals and ruined the livelihood of Mongolia&rsquos herders, forcing them to more en masse to the swollen capital of Ulaanbaatar. Climate change is still putting Mongolians on the move&mdashbut this time, there&rsquos no end in sight.


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