Inligting

Belegging van Gomphi, 48 v.C.


Belegging van Gomphi, 48 v.C.

Die beleg van Gomphi (48 vC) was 'n geringe oorwinning wat Caesar behaal het in die tydperk tussen sy nederlaag in Dyrrhachium in Mei en sy oorwinning in Pharsalus in Augustus (Groot Romeinse burgeroorlog). Caesar het probeer om Pompeius in sy kamp in Dyrrhachium te beleër, maar op 20 Mei het Pompeius deur die keiser se lyne gebreek. Na hierdie nederlaag het Caesar besluit om ooswaarts in Thessalië terug te trek, met Pompeius wat versigtig agterna volg.

By Aeginium het Caesar by 'n ander van sy leërs aangesluit, onder Gnaeus Domitius Calvinus. Die gesamentlike leër vorder daarna op die pad van Epirus na Thessalië, 'n gebied wat oorspronklik beloof het om Caesar te ondersteun. Die nuus van Pompeius se oorwinning in Dyrrhachium het voor Caesar gekom, en het gehelp om Androsthenes, praetor van Thessalië, te oortuig om eerder met Pompeius te gaan staan. Toe Caesar Gomphi nader, wat hy beskryf het as die eerste stad in Thessalië op die pad van Epirus, het Androsthenes boodskappers na Pompeius en Scipio gestuur om hulp te vra en hom gereed gemaak om die stad te verdedig.

Caesar het Pompeius nie tyd gegee om hulp te stuur nie. Die dag toe hy buite Gomphi aankom, het sy manne hul kamp gebou en toe beveel om belegstoerusting te bou. Die aanval het net na 3 die middag begin, en die stad het voor sononder geval. Die manne van Caesar, wat nie genoeg voorraad gehad het nie, mag die stad plunder. Volgens Appian het Caesar se manne so dronk geword dat Pompeius 'n maklike oorwinning kon behaal het as hy nie so ver agter was nie. Appian berig ook dat twintig van die vooraanstaande burgers van die stad dood gevind is in 'n apteker se selfmoord, die prys vir die keuse van die verkeerde kant in die Romeinse burgeroorlog.

Nadat hy Gomphi geneem het, vorder Caesar na Metropolis. Die nuus oor die lot van Gomphi het voor hom verskyn, en die burgers van Metropolis het hom dadelik in hul stad verwelkom. Baie van Thessalië het dieselfde gedoen. Caesar verhuis na Pharsalus, waar die beslissende stryd van die veldtog gevoer sou word.


Slag van Thapsus

Die Slag van Thapsus was 'n verlowing in die Caesar's Civil War wat op 6 April 46 vC [1] naby Thapsus (in die moderne Tunisië) plaasgevind het. Die Republikeinse magte van die Optimates, onder leiding van Quintus Caecilius Metellus Scipio, is beslissend verslaan deur die veteraanmagte wat lojaal was aan Julius Caesar. [2] Dit is kort daarna gevolg deur die selfmoorde van Scipio en sy bondgenoot, Cato die Jongere, Numidiaanse koning Juba, sy Romeinse eweknie Petreius en die oorgawe van Cicero en ander wat Caesar se vergifnis aanvaar het.


Slag van Dyrrhachium

Aan die einde van 49 vC het Caesar en sy 12 legioene by Brundisium aangekom, waar hy gehoop het om deur te gaan na Griekeland. 'N Ou mededinger, Bibulus, het die Ioniumsee met die Republikeinse vloot beheer, en Caesar was bang vir wanneer en hoe om 'n kruising te maak.

Teen Januarie 48 vC besluit Caesar dat daar geen tyd soos die hede is nie, en besluit om 'n verrassende winteroorgang te maak om die voordeel wat die vyand behou in die meerderheid van die vloot, te vergoed. Ongelukkig kon hy net genoeg vervoer kry vir sewe uitgeputte legioene, of 15 000 man en ongeveer 500 kavallerie, en nadat hy veilig by Palaeste geland het, stuur hy sy skepe terug na Brundisium om Marcus Antonius en die oorblywende vyf legioene te vervoer.

Met die verrassingselement wat verdwyn het na die eerste suksesvolle kruising, het Bibulus die boodskap van die terugreis gekry en die vloot van Caesar onderskep. Geblokkeer deur Bibulus, is Antony en Caesar se oorblywende magte, saam met die grootste deel van die voorraad, gedwing om naby Brundisium te wag.

Nou geïsoleer in Griekeland, was Caesar en sy veel kleiner leër ernstig in gevaar. Pompeius was baie groter as hom, ongeveer 55 000+ tot die 15 000 van Caesars, en Caesar was vreeslik min aan voorraad. Caesar het noordwaarts getrek vanaf sy landingsposisie, eers op Apollonia, daarna op Pompeius se belangrike voorraadopslagplek by Dyrrhachium. Pompeius was egter reeds op pad na die stad waar hy van plan was om sy weermag vir die winter te kwartaal.

Intussen het Caesar 'n belangrike diplomatieke gebaar gemaak om oorlog te voorkom. Hy is waarskynlik nog steeds ten volle daarop ingestel om op die slagveld te 'wen', maar hy kan egter seker wees dat enige voorstel vir vrede verwerp sal word. Deur Vibullius Rufus te stuur om te onderhandel, kan Caesar beweer dat hy die vredemaker is en dat Pompeius en die Republikeine die werklike oorsaak van die oorlog was. Ongeag daarvan, het Caesar sy leër na die suidekant van die Apsusrivier verplaas, terwyl Pompeius syne op die noordoewer geplaas het. Daar wag die twee leërs die wintermaande af, terwyl Pompeius niks teen sy veel kleiner vyand doen nie.

In die loop van die winter was Caesar nie ledig nie. Hy en sy manne was nie net besig om kos te soek nie, maar het daarin geslaag om die tafels van Pompeius se vloot om te draai. Bibulus en die vloot het verhoed dat voorraad en versterkings van Antony die keiser bereik, maar die magte van Caesar het verhinder dat die vloot na verskillende hawens kon gaan om ook weer voorsien te word. Teen die middel van die winter sterf Bibulus aan siekte en die Pompeiaanse vloot was net so desperaat soos die keiser se leër.

Op die grond het die situasie meer gelyk aan 'n hereniging van soldate as na twee opponerende leërs wat op die punt was om te veg. Pompeius se manne was duidelik bang vir die keiser, en ondanks hul numeriese meerderwaardigheid, was daar min wil om te veg. Verfratralisering onder die mans aan beide kante het moontlik die steun vir die ledige Pompeius stadig verswak, indien nie vir die ingryping van die voormalige legaat van Caesar, Labienus. Hy skel sy eie manne uit weens hul gebrek aan lojaliteit en verklaar dat die oorlog eers sal eindig wanneer die keiser se kop na hom gebring word. Deur die voortgesette vergaderings tussen beide kante te stop, het die tydige poging van Labienus moontlik 'n volledige oorgawe van die Republikeinse magte aan Caesar verhinder, wat uiteraard gedwing het om die saak in 'n geveg af te handel.

Teen die lente van 48 vC het Antony daarin geslaag om die Republikeinse vloot te vermy en uiteindelik na Griekeland te gaan. Verskriklike winde het Antony en sy vier legioene ver noord van sy doel gestoot, en hy was genoodsaak om naby Lissus te land en Pompeius tussen die twee baie kleiner leërs van Caesar te plaas. Pompeius het sy legaat, Quintus Caecilius Metellus Pius Scipio, beveel om by hom uit Sirië aan te sluit, en Caesar het twee legioene onder Domitius Calvinus losgemaak om hierdie bedreiging te stuit. Nou jaag Pompeius om by Antony uit te kom terwyl hy geïsoleer was, maar Caesar het nie vertraag nie en het agterna gevolg.

Dit lyk asof Pompeius paniekerig geraak het by die gedagte om tussen albei leërs vasgevang te word en tussen hulle uit te maneuver, terwyl Caesar net noordwaarts na Antony, en die noodsaaklike voorraaddepot van Dyrrhachium, voortgegaan het. Pompeius het sy fout besef en probeer om na die depot te jaag, maar hierdie keer was Caesar se manne vinniger. Die twee leërs het kamp opgeslaan aan weerskante van 'n klein rivier genaamd die Shimmihl Torrent, met Caesar in die noorde en Pompeius in die suide, en Dyrrhachium aan die kant van die rivier van Caesar.

Omdat Caesar besef dat toevoer en logistiek steeds die sleutel was, het hy besluit om sy groot vaardigheid in beleëroorlogs te gebruik om Pompeius in te sluit. Die manne van Caesar het 'n indrukwekkende versterkte muur van ongeveer 17 kilometer om Pompeius se leër gebou en dit teen die see vasgemaak. Pompeius, eerder as om sy nog kleiner teenstander aan te val, het geantwoord deur 'n soortgelyke verdedigingswerk te bou. Hoewel Pompeius nog steeds per see voorsien kon word, het hy nie besef dat Caesar die vloei van vars water beheer nie, en hy het dit onmiddellik begin afsny.

Daar was konstante skermutselings, en buite Dyrrhachium sê Caesar dat die twee partye ses gevegte op 'n enkele dag geveg het. Pompeius kon eenvoudig nie deurbreek nie en wanhoop begin intree. Teen die middel van die somer het Pompeius egter 'n gelukkige slag. Twee Galliese hulpverleners is betrap terwyl hulle die loon van legioene gesteel het, maar het daarin geslaag om na Pompeius te ontsnap. Met hierdie twee mans aan sy sy, kon Pompeius die swakste punt in die keiser se muur ontdek. 'N Gedeelte suid van die lyne was nog nie voltooi nie, en dit was die enigste lewensvatbare doelwit vir aanval.

Vroeg in Julie het Pompeius sy leër gekonsolideer en het hy tot ses legioene op die kwesbare posisie vasgehou. Caesar se IX -legioen, verskriklik oorweldig, moes noodgedwonge van die aanslag af wegvlug en Pompeius vestig 'n nuwe kamp aan die buitekant van die muur.

Caesar het probeer om die oortreding met 12 kohorte onder Antony te versterk, en was aanvanklik suksesvol om die terugtog te stuit. Caesar het toe die Pompeiërs teruggery see toe en weer 'n deel van sy muur vasgemaak. 33 kohorte (3 legioene) is teen Pompeius se nuwe kamp gestuur, maar dit is waar dit baie skeefgeloop het.

Die aanvallers was byna twee tot een beman, en hoewel hulle aanvanklik suksesvol was, kon hulle eenvoudig nie die voordeel behou nie. Die regtervleuel van Caesar het begin buig toe dit van agter af geflankeer en bedreig is. Toe die vleuel in duie stort, het die leër van Caesar in paniek geraak en begin roer. Caesar het persoonlik probeer om die terugtog te stuit, maar alles was verlore, en die enigste manier was om sy leër te red. Caesar het eintlik net 1 000 man in die geveg verloor, wat eintlik 'n taamlik klein aangeleentheid was, in ag genome die grootte van die leërs, maar die sleutel was dat Pompeius nou 'n oorwinning kon opeis, en dit in alle erns gedoen het.

Pompeius het vervolgens die mees kritieke fout van die hele oorlog gemaak. Eerder as om voort te gaan met die wankelrige lyne van Caesar, besluit hy om te gaan staan, skynbaar voel hy seker dat Caesar geslaan is en dat die oorlog verby is. In werklikheid sou dit heel moontlik verby gewees het as Pompeius die keiser eenvoudig deur sy loopbane aangeval het. Sy leër sou heel moontlik in 'n volledige roete beland het en massaal gevange geneem of vermoor kon word.

Dit lyk asof Pompeius nie die moed gehad het om die taak te voltooi nie. Caesar het self gesê dat "Vandag was die oorwinning die vyand as daar iemand onder hulle was om dit te wen."

Caesar versamel sy leër en trek weg, in die hoop om Pompeius weg te lok van sy eie bron. Hy het aanvanklik gevolg, maar klein twis in die Republikeinse kamp het hom gedwing om af te breek. Pompeius en die senatore was meer bekommerd oor die verdeling van die buit wat beslis met die oorwinning gepaard sou gaan as om die werk te voltooi. Hierdie pouse het Caesar genoeg tyd gegee om te belê en die stad Gomphi te vang, waar sy leër geplunder en gevoed is. Caesar het weer opgewonde geraak na Pharsalus, waar Pompeius hom uiteindelik ontmoet het.


Die beleg

Pompeius was in 'n sterk posisie met die see op sy rug en omring deur heuwels wat die onmiddellike omgewing beveel het, wat 'n aanval op die posisie onmoontlik gemaak het. Caesar het in plaas daarvan 'n toneelstuk uit die Gallic Wars-speelboek gehaal en sy ingenieurs beveel om mure en vestings te bou om Pompeius teen die see vas te maak. Pompeius reageer met sy eie muur en versterkings om verdere vordering te voorkom. Tussen hierdie twee versterkings is 'n onbepaalde land geskep wat konstante skermutselings met min of geen vordering gesien het nie, soortgelyk aan die loopgraafoorlog van die Eerste Wêreldoorlog. terug, kon per skip weer voorsien word. Namate die beleg besig was, het hul posisies begin verander. Pompeius het met die beperkte grond dit moeilik gevind om genoeg voer vir sy perde te skep en ander voorrade soos vars water word al hoe moeiliker om in stand te hou. Die oes kom nader en binnekort sou Caesar genoeg kos hê om sy posisie te verleng, sodat Pompeius desperaat sou word om uit die beleg te breek. Teen die middel van die somer het Pompeius egter 'n gelukkige geluk gehad. Twee Galliese hulpverleners is betrap terwyl hulle die loon van legioene gesteel het, maar het daarin geslaag om na Pompeius te ontsnap. Met hierdie twee mans aan sy sy, kon Pompeius die swakste punt in die keiser se muur ontdek. 'N Gedeelte suid van die lyne was nog nie voltooi nie en dit was die enigste lewensvatbare doelwit vir aanval.


  1. ↑ 1 000 volgens Caesar self, 1 000 volgens Plutarchus in syne Die lewe van Caesar maar 2 000 volgens dieselfde skrywer in syne Die lewe van Pompeius. 4 000 volgens Orosius. Sommige bronne het moontlik die keisergevangenes wat na die geveg doodgemaak is, in ag geneem.
  2. ↑ "Slag van Dyrrhachium". UNRV. Argief van die oorspronklike op 11 Junie 2011. Besoek op 19 Junie 2011. Onbekende parameter | deadurl = ignoreer (hulp) & lttemplatestyles src = "Module: Citation/CS1/styles.css" & gt & lt/templatestyles & gt
  3. ↑ http: //www.historyofwar.org/articles/battles_dyrrhachium.html
  4. ↑ PlutarchusPompeius65.5, Dryden -vertaling: p. 465.

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Asedio

El principal ej ército cesariano march ó por la calzada romana entre Epiro y Tesalia, pero las noticias de su derrota llegaron antes y Andr óstenes, pretor de Tesalia, se puso del lado pompeyano. [16] ​ Cuando C ésar se aproxim ó a Gonfos, actual Paleo Episkopi, [11] ​ el pretor pidi ó ayuda a Pompeyo y Escipi ón y se prepar ó para defender la ciudad. Onmiddelik kan C ésar dit opbou castra (kampamento) y las m áquinas de asedio. El asalto comenz ó en la tarde y antes del atardecer la noche la urbe hab ໚ ca ໝo. Los soldados cesarianos estaban molestos por la batalla y el hambre que hab ໚n pasado los d ໚s anteriores, as í que C ésar no intentiono contener su furia y saquearon Gonfos. [16] ​

Los cesarianos estaban tan emborrachados que si Pompeyo hubiera llegado a tiempo la victoria le habr ໚ sido f ผil. En la tienda del boticario se encontraron los cad áveres de 20 de los principales ciudadanos de la villa, se suicidaron con veneno. [17] ​ Poco despu és, C ésar sigui ó a Metr ópolis, actual Paleo Kastro, donde exhibi ó a las autoridades de Gonfos, la que se rindi ó de inmediato. Ons kan ook die Tesalia, behalwe Larisa, besoek deur Escipi en#xF3n. [18] ​ [11] ​


Militêre konflikte soortgelyk aan of soos Battle of Thapsus

Geveg op 4 Januarie 46 vC in die Romeinse provinsie Afrika, tussen die Republikeinse magte van die Optimates en magte lojaal aan Julius Caesar. Onder bevel van Titus Labienus, die voormalige ondersteuner van Caesar, wat aan die begin van die burgeroorlog na die Republikeinse kant gegaan het. Wikipedia

Nou Tunisië op 24 Augustus en is geveg tussen Julius Caesar se generaal Gaius Scribonius Curio en die Pompeiaanse Republikeine onder Publius Attius Varus en koning Juba I van Numidia. Verwoestende nederlaag vir die keisersnee en die dood van Curio. Wikipedia

Die beslissende slag van Caesar 's Burgeroorlog. Op 9 Augustus 48 vC te Pharsalus in Sentraal -Griekeland, het Gaius Julius Caesar en sy bondgenote saamgestel onder die leër van die Republiek onder bevel van Gnaeus Pompeius Magnus (& quotPompey the Great & quot). Wikipedia

Geveg tussen die generaal Gaius Scribonius Curio van Julius Caesar en die legioenen van Pompeius onder bevel van Publius Attius Varus, ondersteun deur Numidiaanse kavallerie en voetsoldate wat deur koning Juba I van Numidia gestuur is. Curio verslaan die Pompeiërs en Numidiërs en dryf Varus terug na die stad Utica. Wikipedia

Slag tydens die Caesar 's Burgeroorlog wat naby die stad Dyrrachium (in die huidige Albanië) plaasgevind het. Het geveg tussen Julius Caesar en 'n leër onder leiding van Gnaeus Pompeius wat die steun van die meerderheid van die Romeinse senaat gehad het. Wikipedia

Vroeë militêre konfrontasie met die burgeroorlog van Caesar. Gehou deur 'n mag van Optimates onder bevel van Gnaeus Pompeius Magnus. Wikipedia

Romeinse generaal en staatsman wat 'n kritieke rol gespeel het in die gebeure wat gelei het tot die ondergang van die Romeinse Republiek en die opkoms van die Romeinse Ryk. In 60 vC vorm Caesar, Crassus en Pompeius die Eerste Triumviraat, 'n politieke bondgenootskap wat die Romeinse politiek etlike jare oorheers het. Wikipedia

Die eerste belangrike militêre konfrontasie van die burgeroorlog van Caesar. Gehou deur 'n mag van Optimates onder bevel van Lucius Domitius Ahenobarbus. Wikipedia

Romeinse politikus en generaal wat 'n kritieke rol gespeel het in die transformasie van die Romeinse Republiek van 'n konstitusionele republiek in die outokratiese Romeinse Ryk. Ondersteuner van Julius Caesar, en het as een van sy generaals gedien tydens die verowering van Gallië en die burgeroorlog. Wikipedia

Vooraanstaande Romeinse generaal en staatsman, wie se loopbaan betekenisvol was in die transformasie van Rome van 'n republiek na 'n ryk. 'N Tyd lank 'n politieke bondgenoot en later vyand van Julius Caesar. Wikipedia

Die Romeinse goewerneur van Afrika tydens die burgeroorlog tussen Julius Caesar en Pompeius Magnus (& quotPompey die Grote & quot). In 49 vC teen hom gestuur. Wikipedia

Seestryd het tydens die burgeroorlog van die Caesar aan die kus van Tauroento geveg. Optimale hulpvloot onder leiding van Lucius Nasidius op 31 Julie 49 vC. Ondanks die beduidende getal het die Populares die oorhand gekry en kon die beleg van Massilia voortgaan tot die uiteindelike oorgawe van die stad. Wikipedia

Die Slag van Ilerda het in 49 Junie vC plaasgevind tussen die magte van Julius Caesar en die Spaanse leër van Pompeius Magnus, onder leiding van sy legate Lucius Afranius en Marcus Petreius. Meer 'n maneuverveldtog as werklike gevegte. Wikipedia

Die laaste geveg in die oorloë van die Tweede Triumviraat tussen die magte van Markus Antonius en Octavianus en die leiers van die moord op Julius Caesar, Brutus en Cassius in 42 vC, in Philippi in Masedonië. Langdurige konflik tussen die sogenaamde Optimates en die sogenaamde Populares. Wikipedia

Olifant wat deur mense opgelei en gelei is vir gevegte. Om die vyand aan te kla, hul geledere te breek en terreur in te boesem. Wikipedia

Romeinse senator en generaal, veral bekend as 'n toonaangewende aanhanger van die plan om Julius Caesar op 15 Maart 44 vC te vermoor. Die swaer van Brutus, nog 'n leier van die sameswering. Wikipedia

Die derde en laaste van die Puniese oorloë het tussen Kartago en Rome geveg. Geveg geheel en al binne die Carthaagse gebied, in die moderne noordelike Tunisië. Wikipedia

Informele bondgenootskap tussen drie prominente politici in die laat Romeinse Republiek: Gaius Julius Caesar, Gnaeus Pompeius Magnus en Marcus Licinius Crassus. Komplekse kontrole en balanse wat ontwerp is om te verhoed dat 'n man bo die res uitkom en 'n monargie skep. Wikipedia

Kort militêre konfrontasie tydens die Caesar 's Burgeroorlog. Na 'n nederlaag tydens die Slag van Dyrrhachium, beleër die manne van Gaius Julius Caesar die stad Thessalië Gomphi. Wikipedia

Die laaste slag van Caesar se burgeroorlog teen die leiers van die Optimates. Polities in staat om met triomf na Rome terug te keer en dan as die verkose Romeinse diktator te regeer. Wikipedia

Die militêre veldtogte van Julius Caesar was beide die Galliese Oorlog (58 vC-51 vC) en die burgeroorlog van Caesar (50 vC-45 vC). Nou Frankryk. Wikipedia

Die klein koning van Wes -Numidië met sy hoofstad in Cirta (81–46 vC). Hy is vernoem na of sy naam genoem na sy beroemde voorouer Masinissa I, die vereniger en stigter van die koninkryk Numidia. Wikipedia

Slag wat in Junie van 82 vC plaasgevind het tydens die Tweede Burgeroorlog van die Romeinse Republiek. Die geveg het die Optimates onder bevel van Lucius Cornelius Sulla getref teen die Populares onder bevel van Gnaeus Papirius Carbo. Wikipedia

Reeks skermutselinge en gevegte wat tussen die magte van Julius Caesar, Cleopatra VII, Arsinoe IV en Ptolemaeus XIII plaasgevind het, tussen 48 en 47 vC. Gedurende hierdie tyd was Caesar besig met 'n burgeroorlog teen die magte van die Romeinse senaat. Na die Slag van Pharsalus, tussen die magte van Caesar en die van Gnaeus Pompeius Magnus en die Senaat, is die meerderheid van die magte onder bevel van Pompeius verstrooi of aan Caesar oorgegee. Wikipedia


Roman Siege Works

Die hoofdoel van hierdie boek ”, skryf Davies in sy inleiding, “is om die bewustheid te verhoog van die belangrikheid van veldwerke vir die sukses (of andersins) van Romeinse belegingsoperasies ” (8). 1 Dit is moeilik om te sien hoe so 'n doel bereik kan word sonder 'n algemene besef van die Romeinse belegoorlog. Hoe anders kan ons die bewering van D. dat veldwerke belangrik was, toets? Ongelukkig word slegs die skaarsste opsomming van die algemene traject van ontwikkelings ” (133) aangebied, amper as 'n nagedagte, weggesteek in die finale gevolgtrekking. En nog erger, D. het as voorbeelde slegs die beleëringe gekies waartydens veldwerke opgerig is, wat stilweg oor die ander gegaan het.

Vir hom was die dilemma wat elke Romeinse bevelvoerder in die gesig gestaar het, “ watter manier van belegstelsel gebruik moet word ” (37). 2 Maar baie keer het die Romeine glad nie 'n belegerstelsel gebruik nie. Vir elke Capua (212/211 vC waar die stad omring was deur 'n dubbele sloot-en-skans-stelsel, was daar 'n Leontini (214 vC waar die belegers eenvoudig die hekke gedwing het, of 'n Arpi (213 vC waar die stad ingeneem is) klandestiene eskalade. Vir elke Thala (108 v.C. omring deur 'n sloot en palisade, bedreig deur walle en geteister deur belegmasjinerie, was daar 'n Vaga (109 v.C.) of 'n Capsa (107 v.C. waar die Romeine geen “ beleg werkelemente gebou het nie & Die bekende blokkade van Numantia (133 vC waartydens die terrein omring is deur 'n klipmuur wat 'n reeks forte en kampe verbind, is voorafgegaan deur twee mislukte pogings met betrekking tot frontale aanval (141/140 vC) en escalade (138 vC), maar geen belegstelsel nie.

Hoe dit ook al sy, D. het 'n boek geskryf oor belegwerke, wat hy omskryf as al die strukture en kenmerke gebou deur 'n aanvaller om operasies (direk of indirek) teen 'n verdedigde sentrum te onderneem (7, outeur en kursief). Hy sluit eksplisiet belegmasjinerie van elke tipe uit, op grond van die feit dat hulle in wese mobiele karakter en die feit dat hulle bymekaargemaak is in plaas van gekonstrueer, hulle onderskei van die ‘ vasgemaakte ’ strukturele elemente ” (7). Maar so 'n eng definisie kan op meer as een punt betwis word. Eerstens het die ou mense self nie so 'n onderskeid getref nie. Die take om byvoorbeeld 'n wal op te rig en 'n belegstoring te bou, was beide werke “werke ” ( opera of, in Grieks, ἔργα), uitgevoer deur dieselfde mans onder leiding van dieselfde architecti of ἀρχιτέκτονες. 3 Tweedens, om die konsep van konstruksie te beperk sodat dit nie op belegmasjiene kan geld nie, is heeltemal willekeurig en ongegrond deur die taalkundige bewyse. 4 En derdens maak dit min sin om die studie van belegoorlogvoering tot strukture te beperk, terwyl die masjiene wat die strukture dikwels ontwerp is, geïgnoreer word. Die leser is nie in staat om die idees van D ’ oor die ligging van artillerie te evalueer nie, byvoorbeeld (83-84), sonder 'n bespreking van die vorm en funksie van antieke katapulte. 5

D. verdeel sy boek in agt hoofstukke. Hy begin met 'n oorsig van “The Literary Sources ” (hfst. 1, 9-24), waarin hy die leser bekendstel aan die belangrikste historici en tegniese skrywers. Dit word gevolg deur “ Die beleg in die konteks van die Romeinse oorlogvoering ” (hfst. 2, 25-34), waarin hy die omstandighede bespreek waaronder 'n beleg kan ontstaan. Hier is die poging om beleërings as '#beplande ” gebeurtenisse of'##reaktiewe ” gebeurtenisse te kategoriseer, nie oortuigend nie. D. gee 'n voorbeeld van die “reaktiewe ” beleg deur te beweer dat die toekomstige keiser Tiberius “ verplig was om die Dalmatiese Andetrium (9 nC) te beleër om te verhoed dat Bato dit as 'n veilige basis vir guerrilla -aktiwiteite ” (28) gebruik, maar soortgelyk redenasie bepaal Scipio Aemilianus ’ “planned ” beleg van Numantia (133 vC). Daar moes altyd 'n mate van reaksie gewees het, maar dit is nie dieselfde as om onvoorbereid te wees nie. Toe Caesar die poorte van Gomphi onverwags teëkom (48 v.C., is sy gewelddadige en skielike aanranding voorafgegaan deur deeglike voorbereiding in die vorm van kampbou en die vinnige konstruksie van lere, skuilings en skerms.

Die res van die boek bestaan ​​uit afsonderlike hoofstukke oor 'n seleksie van D. 62), “Circumvallation ” (hfst. 5, 63-95), “ Aanrandings en beleëringshope ” (hfst. 6, 97-116), “Myne ” (hfst. 7, 117-124 ), en “ Diverse ingenieurswerke ” (hfst. 8, 125-131). Onder voorbereidende werke lys D. die beveiliging van toevoerlyne, die verkenning van die beleëringsgebied, die oprigting van siftingswerke en grondvoorbereiding. Sy volgende element, die “blockade camp, ” is egter minder goed bedink. Hy definieer dit as 'n basis van waaruit die beleër kan optree om voorrade of versterkings wat na 'n verdedigde posisie gestuur word, te verbied of om te voorkom dat soektogte of voerprojekte van dieselfde ” (145). Die argeologiese voorbeelde van Nahal Hever pas beslis by hierdie beskrywing, alhoewel die historiese konteks daarvan by gebrek aan dateringsgetuienis suiwer spekulasie is. Baie van D. ’s se ander voorbeelde is egter minder toepaslik: Marcellus ’s hiberna in Syracuse (213-212 vC Scipio kamp in Cartagena (210 vC Caesar se kampe in Avaricum en Gergovia (52 vC)) is niks hiervan gebruik om 'n blokkade af te dwing nie. leërs het gereeld 'n basiskamp versterk, maar dit vereis spesiale pleidooie om die benaming van 'n blokkamp te regverdig.

D. is van mening dat daar 'n oorgang was na die aanneming van omvang as die voorkeur -middel van isolasie ” (46). Die beleëringe van Agrigentum (262 v.C.) en Lilybaeum (250-241 v.C.) is sekerlik die vroegste voorbeelde van Romeinse omseil, hoewel D. dit as 'n uitgebreide blokkadekampstelsel kategoriseer, en beweer dat, eers later, het hulle 'n omskakeling ondergaan na 'n volledige stelsel van omseiling/kontravalering en#8221 (51). 6 Hy beklemtoon Capua (212/211 vC) as die eerste werklike onderskrywing van die waarde van 'n goed georganiseerde omvangskema, en beweer dat daar 'n merkbare toename in die gebruik van omvang was en daarna (64) ). Maar ondersteun die statistieke hierdie gevolgtrekking werklik? Daar was twee, miskien drie, omseilings tydens die Eerste Puniese Oorlog (Agrigentum, Lilybaeum, en die moontlike voorbeeld van Panormus, 254 v.C. en nog twee tydens die Tweede Puniese Oorlog (Capua, en Scipio Asiaticus ’ beleg van Orongis, 207 v.C.) .. In die tydperk van sestig jaar het Romeinse leërs die taktiek dus vier tot vyf keer gebruik, sover ons weet, terwyl meer as 'n dosyn dorpe in dieselfde tydperk deur 'n storm bestorm is. #8220 merkbare toename in die gebruik van omseil en#8221 (64), die vyf-en-sewentig jaar wat die beleëringe van Orongis en Numantia geskei het, was slegs twee keer 'n beleggingstrategie, in Ambracia (189 v.C.) en in Kartago (146 v.C.). , D. verkies om die beleëringswerke van Scipio op die landengte in Kartago as 'n vierkantige lang fort te beskryf (47). Dit is egter duidelik dat dit in konsep eenvoudig 'n lineêre weergawe van die Capuan -omvang was, ontwerp om die landmus af te sluit met 'n dubbele versterkingslyn s. D. verklaar dat, wat andersins as 'n beleggingslyn beskou kan word, die karakter van 'n blokkadekamp gekry het (53), maar die strategie van Scipio was aggressief, sonder 'n blokkerende bedoeling. 8

D. noem Metellus se sloot rondom Thala (108 vC) as 'n bewys dat omseiling 'n nuttige voorloper van meer direkte benaderings geword het. Maar dit is blykbaar nie die geval nie. Die volgende aangetekende geval kom eers 'n generasie later, toe Sulla die taktiek (passief, moet opgemerk) in Athene (87/6 v.C.) en Praeneste (82 v.C. van Tigranocerta (69 vC) dat ons weer die aggressiewe gebruik van omseil herken. D. spring vorentoe om die standaard keiserlike belegingsbenadering te beskryf, waardeur aanrandingsvoorbereidings onmiddellik in werking gestel is nadat die omseiling voltooi was ” (65). Ironies genoeg is hierdie analise nie eens akkuraat vir die beleëringe wat eintlik omsingeling behels het nie, nog minder vir die keiserslanings in die algemeen. Slegs die helfte van die keisers se beleërings het 'n omvang behels, en die meeste hiervan is as blokkades uitgespreek, wat eerder weerspreek die idee dat hy passiewe blokkade as 'n vermorsing van hulpbronne beskou het (134). Nie net is D's bloudruk vir die standaard keisersnee -benadering nie, maar ook die teorie dat 'n aanranding wat gewoonlik gepaard gaan met 'n omwenteling, is eintlik verkeerd, maar slegs die keiser se beleëring van Ategua (45 v.C.) en die stad Atuatuci (57 v.C.) pas by hierdie model. 9

Op die onderwerp van die beleëringswal, glo D. dat hy twee verskillende taktiese funksies kan onderskei, wat sy onderverdeling in aanrandingshellinge en beleghope regverdig. Eersgenoemde, skryf hy, word opgehef om die hoogte van 'n verdedigingswerk ewewydig te maak, wat die deurloop van stormende partye moontlik maak en enjins te monteer wat 'n breuk kan bewerkstellig, terwyl laasgenoemde parallel tot of haal die hoogte van 'n verdedigingswerk oor, wat toesig hou oor die verdedigers en die voordelige plasing van artillerie ” (146). 'N Goeie onderskeid. Die meeste besprekings oor D. ’'s handel inderdaad oor aanvalrampe. Maar hy kategoriseer die keiser se wal by Uxellodunum (51 v.C.) en die twee groot strukture wat Trebonius by Massilia (49 v.C.) ” as “ enkelfunksie beleghope ” (99), en bied, as argeologiese bevestiging, die oorblyfsels by Cremna. Die saak vir so 'n onderverdeling word nooit ten volle beredeneer nie, maar die beredenering van D. blyk die feit te wees dat die Cremna -wal liggies opwaarts neig, wat 'n maklike vooruitgang bied vir die artillerie (of die belegstoring) wat geposisioneer is op sy beraad ” (108). Dit is natuurlik 'n perfekte beskrywing van die “ -oprithelling, ”, wat ook vereis dat swaar masjinerie langs die top beweeg moet word. Die verdedigers van Cremna het inderdaad geen illusies gehad oor die naderende gevaar nie, terwyl hulle moeite gedoen het om hul mure teen die verwagte aanslag aan te val.

Wat mynbou betref, is D. verplig om Griekse en Persiese voorbeelde in te voer om 'n taamlik onbeduidende hoofstuk in te vul. Behalwe 'n lang beskrywing van die Persiese tonnels by Dura Europos, noem hy slegs die Romeinse tonnel tydens Nobelior se beleg van Ambracia (189 v.C. Sulla ’s beleg van Piraeus (87/86 vC en Julian ’s beleg van Maiozamalcha (363 nC)) Avaricum, ver van dit om die ondergang van die vyandelike kring te bewerkstellig, is die mynbou daar ontwerp deur die Galliërs om die wal van Caesar te destabiliseer. 10 Laastens gebruik D. 'n opvallende, uiteenlopende kategorie om die baksteentoring wat deur Trebonius by Massilia opgerig is, te omvat (49 vC, die ingenieurswerf wat deur Adolf Schulten in Masada geïdentifiseer is (hier onverklaarbaar 'n ” genoem) Krulwaaier“), en die mislukte hawermol by Lilybaeum (250 v.C. waarvoor D. die “novel-ontwerp van puin wat deur artillerie afgelewer is, as deel van die invulproses bedink ” (126). 11

In his conclusion, D. claims that “this concentration on the topic of siege works has allowed us to observe how Roman practice would appear to have varied over time” (133). But, as each chapter jumps from siege to siege in a desultory fashion, chronologically from Fidenae to Cyzicus, alphabetically from Agrigentum to Zama, the result is rather disjointed. Equally, the lack of an historical framework makes it difficult to identify any overall trends, and the emphasis on the small corpus of material remains unfortunately leads to a skewed picture of Roman siegecraft. 12

1. I am unsure what D. means by his parenthetic “or otherwise.” Does he mean to imply that field works were important to the mislukking of Roman siege operations? And if so, how?

2. D. defines a “siege system” as “the general tactical deployment adopted by a besieger to achieve the reduction of a defended position comprising the totality of various disparate siege work elements” (146). The latter comprise “any structure or feature constructed by an assailant for the purpose of prosecuting operations (directly or indirectly) against a defended position” (146).

3. In his description of the siege of Ambracia (189 BC Livy illustrates the point well when he refers to Nobilior’s siege works as munimenta (“fortifications”) and his battering-rams as opera (“works”) (Livy 38.5.1) in Polybius’ version, the battering rams are likewise called ἔργα .

4. The example of Eretria (198 BC where “the surroundings offered timber in abundance for the construction of opera from scratch” (Livy 32.16.10), addresses D.’s contention that siege machines were not “constructed.” As these newly-built “works” subsequently demolished the walls, they are likely to have been battering rams and not some kind of siege structure.

5. For example, D. refers to “firing stations” for artillery, spaced along the circumvallation at Machaerus, but the platforms in question have a maximum depth of 2m, which is far too small for a standard arrow-shooting catapult.

6. D.’s use of the term circumvallation is confusing. No-one would dispute his initial definition, namely “any work of encirclement designed to ensure the complete investment of a target” (63). However, he then adds unnecessary complication by changing the definition “in those siege systems that deploy two distinct encircling lines” (145): “here, circumvallation may be taken to refer to the outward-facing barrier, whilst an inward-facing line should be distinguished as a contravallation” (63). This is a resurrection of the illogical scheme devised by Napoléon III to describe the remains at Alesia cf. D.B. Campbell, Besieged. Siege Warfare in the Ancient World (Oxford, 2006), 192-195. For such double investments, the term “bicircumvallation,” coined by Peter Connolly, seems preferable: Greece and Rome at War (London, 1981), 292-293.

7. The opera which Livy reports circa Oreum (199 BC) may possibly indicate a circumvallation (Livy 31.46.14).

8. For the siege works at Carthage, see D.B. Campbell, Ancient Siege Warfare. Persians, Greeks, Carthaginians and Romans, 546-146 BC (Oxford, 2005), 40 plate G, with 63.

9. Details drawn from D.B. Campbell, Aspects of Roman Siegecraft, unpublished PhD thesis (University of Glasgow, 2002).

10. Caes., BGall. 7.22: ” [Galli] aggerem cuniculis subtrahebant. D. is perhaps confused by Caesar’s aperti cuniculi, which appear to be long sheltered corridors running along the Roman embankment cf. Campbell, op. cit. (note 6), 132, following T. Rice Holmes, Caesar’s Conquest of Gaul (Oxford, 1911), 144.

11. There is no sign of this in Polyb. 1.47.4. Perhaps D. has been misled by Paton’s Loeb translation, which renders τὸ ῥιπτούμενον as “all they shot in.”

12. I noted the following errors. Diodorus Siculus comments on the origins of Roman siegecraft at 23.2.1, not 13.2.1 (8 and 137 n. 1) the Hellenistic period properly dates from the death of Alexander the Great, rather than “from the mid-fifth century BC” (8) for ” aide memoires” (9), read aides-mémoire “Dio Cassius” is usually known as Cassius Dio (10, 13, et al.) “the compiler of the Scriptores Historiae Augustae” (13) should be the compiler of the Historia Augusta (since the scriptores are the fictional writers) Polyaenus (fl. AD 160) is by no stretch of the imagination a Hellenistic author and there is no reason to characterise the Romans as his “foreign enemies” (16) “Philip the son of Demetrius” (16) is usually known as Philip V of Macedon (son of Demetrius II), so the separate index entries should be combined (158) the “Amphictyonic investment (date?) of Cirrha” (16) (or Crisa, as it is called by Frontinus) may be placed within the bracket 595-585 BC, as it occurred during the First Sacred War Philon of Byzantium belongs broadly to the later 3rd century BC, and it is only a theory that he was “writing in the 240s BC for the Ptolemaic army” (16) “Scipio Africanus the Younger” is usually known as Scipio Aemilianus (26) “M. Fulvius” (32, 35, et al.) is usually known as M. Fulvius Nobilior “M’. Acilius Glabrio” (102) is elsewhere given the wrong praenomen (37) and his name is jumbled in the index (155) there was no “hermetic circumvallation” at Syracuse (52 also 64, 133) there is no reason to suppose that the siege towers at Lilybaeum “were earthfast rather than mobile structures” (52) “Pompeius Aulus” (59) is usually known as Q. Pompeius it is debateable whether there are “practice works” at Woden Law (73) the captions to figs. 22 and 23 appear to have been transposed (75) Ammianus does not recommend “towers made of sun-dried brick or turf” for onagers (84) the skeleton at Dura Europos was found in Tunnel 1, not Tunnel 3 (121) note 15 to chapter 5 (presumably a reference to Cicero’s Ad familiares) is missing (140) the “Leuké” at Masada, consistently cited in its Greek form (81, 94, 101, 128), is absent from the index and Labrousse 1966 (cited on 143 n. 17), Lammert 1932 (cited on 143 n. 3), and Shatzman 1989 (cited on 138 n. 5) are missing from the bibliography.


Atrax in 198 BC

At Atrax in 198 BC, Quinctius Flamininus threw up a siege embankment to carry rams up to the wall, and although his troops entered the town through the resulting breach they were repulsed by the Macedonian garrison. The siege tower that Flamininus then deployed almost fell over when one of its wheels sank in the rutted embankment, and the Romans finally gave up (Livy 32.18.3). Their failure can probably be attributed to inexperience in mechanized siege warfare: first, their siege embankment was obviously insufficiently compacted to bear the weight of heavy machinery and second, they seem rarely to have used a siege tower before.

PHILIP V. Philip V of Macedon reigned more than a century after Alexander the Great. His family were the Antigonids, who had risen to power some 80 years before. Mercurial by nature, capable of military brilliance as well as acts of colossal stupidity, Philip was a brave and charismatic general who spent his entire reign fighting enemies to the north, south, east and west. The war with Rome was to prove his nemesis.

TITUS QUINCTIUS FLAMININUS. Flamininus was a fine example of the politician who let nothing get in his way. Serving as various types of magistrate during the war with Hannibal, he succeeded in becoming consul – one of the two most senior magistrates in the Republic – at the tender age of 30. Unusually for the time, he could write and speak Greek, but his love of all things Hellenic did not stop him spearheading a successful invasion of Macedon.

Northern Greece

MACEDON AND ITS NEIGHBOURS IN 202BC

Under Philip II and his son Alexander the Great, Macedon rose to a position of pre-eminence never equalled by any Greek city state before or after. By the late third century BC, the kingdom had seen better days. That said, although it was much reduced in size, it remained the dominant military power in Greece and continued to exert huge influence over the region. Naturally, this made it unpopular. Macedon ruled the central region of Thessaly, and through three well-situated fortresses (Chalcis, Demetrias and the Acrocorinth, the so-called `Fetters of Greece’) exerted military control over the area around Athens, as well as on the Peloponnese peninsula. Macedon also ruled part of the coastline of Asia Minor, as well as some of the islands in the Aegean Sea.

The rest of Greece remained divided into city states, small powers ruled by their own citizens. It’s important to stress here that there was almost no sense of `Greekness’ at this time. People identified themselves by the place they lived in, and were often at odds with those from other towns or city states. Powers such as Athens and Sparta, which had ruled supreme centuries before, were but shadows of their former selves. Thebes no longer existed, having been crushed by Alexander, and Corinth lay under Macedonian control. Aetolia, in west-central Greece, was one of the stronger city states, and a bitter enemy of Macedon. Other powers included Argos, Elis and Messenia on the Peloponnese, tiny Acarnania in southwest Greece, and Boeotia, the latter two both being allied to Macedon.

Carthage, Macedon and the Seleucid Empire – had all been beaten by Rome in war. In a mere 50 years, the Republic had morphed from a regional power with few territories into one that utterly dominated the Mediterranean world. This seismic change set Rome on the road to becoming an empire, a self-fulfilling path from which there was no turning back.

The Republic’s war with Carthage lasted for 17 bitter years, from 218 BC to 201 BC. It was a conflict initiated by the Carthaginian military genius Hannibal Barca. Invading Italy by crossing the Alps in winter, he inflicted crushing defeats on the Romans at the Trebbia, Lake Trasimene and Cannae. Yet Hannibal never succeeded in forcing his enemies to surrender. Obdurate and resilient, Rome recruited new legions to replace those that had been annihilated, and fought on. It was a long, drawn-out war that spanned four fronts: mainland Italy, Sicily, Spain and, lastly, Carthage, in what is now Tunisia.

Old grudges die hard

One might think that the Romans would have had enough of war once victory over Hannibal and Carthage had been secured. Far from it. Less than two years after the decisive Battle of Zama, the Republic opened hostilities with King Philip V of Macedon. his wasn’t a conflict that had come from nowhere, however: the Romans and Philip had history with one another.

In 215 BC, the year after the Battle of Cannae, the chance interception of a ship off the southern coast of Italy had brought to light a most unwelcome revelation. Documents seized by the Roman navy proved that Philip and Hannibal had come together in secret alliance against the Republic. The Senate immediately sent a fleet to the east, its task to contain the Macedonian King. Events in Illyria soon took on a life of their own, and in 214 BC, war broke out between Rome and Macedon.

The conflict lingered on until 205 BC, a stop-start affair that played out all around the Greek coastline. Macedon fought alone, while the Romans had allies throughout the region. here were sieges, lightning-fast raids and withdrawals, victories and defeats on both sides. When peace was finally negotiated, the Republic’s war with Hannibal was nearing its final act – it suited the Romans to end the conflict with Macedon. Aetolia, Rome’s chief Greek ally, had had enough too. Philip, on the other hand, had reason to be content, having lost none of his territories and gained part of Illyria.

In the five years that followed, Hannibal was defeated by Scipio at Zama, while Philip busied himself campaigning on the coast of Asia Minor, where he had some successes against Rhodes, the Kingdom of Pergamum and others. For every achievement, however, it seemed Philip suffered a setback. He besieged but failed to take the city of Pergamum, and in a naval battle at Chios he lost a large part of his fleet, as well as thousands of sailors and soldiers. he most humiliating incident was the six months in the winter of 201-200 BC that Philip spent barricaded in a bay in western Turkey by a Pergamene and Rhodian fleet. Finally escaping by night, slipping past the ships of his enemies, he made his way back to Macedon.

Whatever other misjudgements Philip had made, he had been astute enough to avoid conflict with the powerful Seleucid Empire, which controlled most of modern-day Turkey and sprawled eastwards into the Middle East, Afghanistan and India. He also entered into a secret agreement with the Seleucid ruler, Antiochus III, that allowed both powers to attack settlements belonging to Ptolemaic Egypt.

Rome’s revenge

Philip’s actions in Asia Minor were to have major repercussions. In the autumn of 201 BC, Rhodes and Pergamum both sent embassies to Rome pleading for aid against him. Despite having rebuffed Aetolian emissaries asking for the same help only a few years before, this time the Senate listened – but its first motion for war was rejected by the Centuriate, the people’s assembly.

It is no surprise that the very people who had bled and died in vast numbers during the struggle against Hannibal were reluctant to pick up their swords and shields again so soon, but their resistance was short-lived. Politicians have always been prone to ignoring decisions made by plebiscite, and after six months – and in all likelihood, after some significant back-room politicking – the Centuriate reversed its decision.

It was late in the summer of 200 BC before an army was dispatched to Illyria. he chosen commander was Publius Sulpicius Galba, an experienced politician and leader who had served in various positions during the war with Hannibal, including that of consul. Setting up base near the city of Apollonia by September, Galba sent a legion up one of the several mountain valleys that led to Macedon. After a short siege, the town of Antipatreia was taken and sacked. Prudently deciding to end his year’s campaign before winter arrived, Galba consolidated his position in Apollonia and waited for the spring.

Philip did the same in Macedon, but as soon as the weather began to improve in early 199 BC, he marched his army west from his capital of Pella. It was difficult to know which route Galba would use to invade history doesn’t record whether Philip had scouts watching every valley, but it would have made sense to do so.

In the event, Galba chose the Apsus Valley. Philip rushed to defend it, but Rome’s legions smashed past his phalanx and into western Macedon. Although the defeat was incomplete – Philip’s army escaped almost entirely – this was a pivotal moment in the war, when the extraordinarily maneuverable Roman maniple proved itself superior to the rigidly structured phalanx.

Galba’s army marched eastward in search of Philip’s host, and a game of cat and mouse ensued through the summer, with each side seeking battle on its own terms. A victory for the Romans at Ottolobus, when Philip almost lost his life recklessly leading his Companion Cavalry against the enemy, was countered by a Macedonian win at Pluinna. Sadly, the locations of both Ottolobus and Pluinna have been lost to history.

The harvest of 199 BC arrived without a conclusive outcome. Galba, far from his base of Apollonia, with his supply lines at risk of being cut by snow or the Macedonians, took the sensible option and retreated to the Illyrian coast.

Titus Quinctius Flamininus

In many ways, the politics of 2,000 years ago were no different to today: the new man always likes to take control. Although it was common in the mid-Republic for a general to be left in command of the war he was prosecuting, Galba found himself supplanted by the current consul, Villius, soon after his return to Apollonia. Villius in turn was replaced only a few months later, in early 198 BC, by the brand-new consul, Titus Quinctius Flamininus thirty years old – a young age to be in command of a large army – he was a formidable figure who took the invasion in his stride. A lover of all things Hellenic, he could speak and write Greek, something unusual for Romans of the time.

Flamininus decided to try a different valley to Galba, that of the River Aous. He found his path blocked by Philip’s phalanx and an impressive series of defences, leading to a 40-day stand-off during which the Romans must have mounted many unsuccessful attacks. A dramatic meeting between Flamininus and Philip took place during this time, across the Aous. The Roman historian Livy records that Flamininus demanded Philip remove his garrisons from all Greek towns and pay reparations to those whose lands he had ravaged: Athens, Pergamum and Rhodes. Unpalatable though these demands were – being issued to a Hellenic king on his own territory by a non-Greek invader – Philip conceded. Unsurprisingly, he balked at Flamininus’ next demand, that he should surrender the towns of Thessaly to their own populations, reversing a legacy of Macedonian control of more than 150 years.

The impasse resumed, but soon after a local guide was found to lead a Roman force up and around the Macedonian positions. Attacked from in front and behind, Philip’s army broke and fled it was thanks only to the phalanx that a complete slaughter was prevented. Pursued eastward, Philip had to abandon the same Thessaly he had refused to deliver to Flamininus only days before. It was a humiliating moment for the Macedonian King, all the more so as he had to torch his own farmland and towns to deny supplies to the enemy.

Defeat seemed imminent, but redemption was to come from an unexpected quarter. Despite the loss of the strategically important fortress of Gomphi, Philip’s forces proved victorious at another stronghold, Atrax. When the Roman catapults battered a hole in the wall and the legionaries charged in, they were faced by the phalanx in a tightly confined space. he sources are silent on details, but what happened there persuaded Flamininus to retreat from Thessaly.

Fine September weather meant that the year’s campaign did not come to an end at the usual time. Flamininus’s considerable successes saw the Greek city states, many of which had been playing neutral, move towards the Roman camp – or in the case of Aetolia and Achaea, join it outright. Several towns in Boeotia fell to the legions, and the mighty fortress of the Acrocorinth was besieged by a combined force of Romans, Pergamenes and Achaeans. his attack failed, but it signalled the end of Philip’s ability to retain territories outside Macedon. he future looked bleak.

Macedonian phalanx

The Romans had been fighting the Macedonian phalanx for more than a century. Pyrrhus defeated the Romans with it in the early third century, the Carthaginians in Africa in the middle of the century did as well, and Hannibal did the same later. In 197 bc the Romans had won a terrifying victory against Perseus’s father at Cynoscephalae, a battle that vividly illustrated the terrible power of the phalanx’s charge, even on unsuitable ground. In the year 198 bc before Cynoscephalae, the Roman siege of Atrax had failed when a Macedonian phalanx drawn up in a breach in the wall had proved quite impervious to Roman attack. Polybius’s judgment that “when the phalanx has its characteristic virtue and strength nothing can sustain its frontal attack or withstand the charge” will have been no news to Roman commanders. The phalanx’s fatal flaw, Polybius says, is that it requires flat terrain so that it can preserve its close order. Perseus’s father’s unwise decision to fight on broken ground allowed the Romans to defeat him at Cynoscephalae. But Aemilius Paullus consented to fight the Macedonian phalanx on a plain, ideally suited to it, on ground that Perseus had chosen for exactly that reason.

Crisis of conference

In likely recognition of this, Philip agreed to a conference with Flamininus and his allies in November 198 BC. It also suited the wily Flamininus to negotiate, because in Rome, consular elections were around the corner. If he was to be replaced (as he had done to Villius) then a peace treaty with Philip was the best option if his command was renewed, on the other hand, Flamininus could fight Macedon to a finish.

Three days of heated negotiations without agreement saw Philip request to send an embassy to Rome he would abide, he said, by the decision of the Senate. Flamininus agreed, knowing full well that once there, Philip would be asked to surrender the three fortresses that protected Macedon to the south – the so-called `Fetters of Greece’, Acrocorinth, Chalcis and Demetrias. And so it proved. Flamininus’ command was renewed, and Philip’s outwitted ambassadors could not agree to the Senate’s demand to evacuate the Fetters. Both parties retired for the winter.

In spring 197 BC, the war resumed. Rather than in mountain valleys, this year the fighting would take place in Thessaly. By May, both armies were marching towards each other on the coast. Taking account of his allies, Flamininus had about 26,000 men Philip’s troops were of similar strength, including 16,000 phalangists.

Skirmishes and maneuvering saw both parties march westward, separated by a range of hills. As is often the case with battles of vital importance, the fighting began by accident when Flamininus’s scouts clashed with Philip’s advance force in bad weather, atop the hills of Cynoscephalae. Reinforcements were sent by both sides as the skirmish spiralled out of control and, before long, both commanders had deployed their armies.

The phalanx falters

Unhappy with the ground and lacking half of his phalanx (which was out scouting), Philip went to battle reluctantly. At first, things went well, with his phalangists driving the Roman left flank down the hillside towards their own camp. Victory might have seemed possible, but things changed fast when Flamininus led his right flank up towards the second half of Philip’s phalanx, which had arrived late to the battle. Panicked by the Romans’ elephants, these disorganised phalangists broke and ran.

Misfortune then turned into disaster for Philip when a quick-thinking Roman officer broke away from Flamininus’ position with several thousand legionaries and attacked the exposed flank and rear of the remaining half of the phalanx. Unable to defend themselves, the phalangists were slain in large numbers the rest fled the field.

The defeat did not see Philip removed from his throne by Flamininus. Rome was well aware of the threat posed by the wild peoples to the north of Macedon and the Seleucid Empire to its east. Philip could serve nicely as a buffer, while also paying reparations and sending one of his sons to Rome as a hostage.

Effectively, Cynoscephalae signalled the end of Macedonian and Greek independence. he city states that had allied themselves to the Republic would realise this too late, and just a year later, in 196 BC, the Aetolians lamented how the Romans had unshackled the feet of the Greeks only to put a collar around their necks.


BATTLE REPORT # 8 - PHARSALUS 48 BC (CAESAR VS POMPEY)

Roman Republic 49 BC.Rome rules the western world.Gaius julius caesar,rome's most famous general, has just completed conquest of gaul,and now seeks a consulship-in-absentia from the roman senate,as his term as governor has expired-so he can return to rome without being prosecuted by his many jealous enemies in the senate for unlawful activities during his tenure.They are backed by Pompey the great,before caesar the most famous roman general and one time ally and son-in law of caesar,now 58, older than caesar.

During the last decade the 3 most powerful Roman politicians ,Pompey,Crassus and Caesar had come to an informal agreement to divide up the empire into respective spheres of influence and support each other to thwart the senate,called the three headed monster or the first triumvirate.Caesar got Gaul and Illyria,Pompey got Spain and Crassus rich Syria(they would back each other and rig election ,and set up their proxy consuls each year)However Crassus is killed on campaign against parthia at carrhae,and julia ,caesar's daughter and pompey's wife dies at childbirth-severing the ties between the two.

(Left to Right - Caesar,Crassus,Pompey)

''Pompey would accept no equal and Caesar no superior"

5000 men) catches the republicans completely off guard and creates panic in rome.Caesar heads straight for rome,while being reinforced by more legions and brushes aside resistance.
Pompey and the senate abandon Italy for greece with as many troops as they can embark at brundisium-as pompey understands that their mobilization is far from complete and the available hastily raised levies would be useless against caesar's veteran army.They intend to reach greece and rebuild their force (by collecting all the legions deployed in the eastern provinces),and recieving aid from all the eastern client kings -most of which owe their positions to pompey's earlier conquests.They barely escape caesar's pursuing force which besieged brundisium but was unable to prevent the pompeian fleet evacuating the republicans and their forces at the last moment.

Caesar consolidates his position in italy,calls a rump senate of loyalists then heads towards spain-where pompey's subordinates,afrainius,petreius and governor varro have 7 legions between them.
Caesar links up with his initial advance force under his subordinate fabius and then moves against the pompeians who are camped with 5 legions under afrainius and petrieus.Varro is in the spanish interior with 2 more.

Shortly after, Caesar arriving, active operations were at once begun by moving the camp close up to the enemy's so as to restrict the movement of his foragers. In order to cut Afranius off from the bridge at Ilerda, Caesar attempted to occupy a ridge which lay between the camps, but the XIV. legion was driven back. Counter-attacking with the IX. legion he drove a large party of the enemy into Ilerda and then tried to assault this city by forcing his way up a ravine,but was beaten back with losses.

Two days after this battle, which reflected no great credit on Caesar, his bridges over the Sicoris were swept away by a flood, and his communications with Gaul severed worse still, his convoys could no longer reach him. Learning that he was expecting a large convoy, Afranius crossed the bridge at Ilerda with three legions and all his cavalry and attacked it. The attack, however, failed, and Caesar building a boat bridge 22 miles north of his camp enabled his convoy to cross, and his cavalry to attack Afranius's foragers.

In order further to restrict his enemy, by running the river into a number of artificial channels he created a ford near his camp which forced the Pompeians to transport two legions over the Sicoris to protect their communications, and then, on June 23, still holding the bridge they crossed their whole army over to the left bank, and set out towards the Ebro. Caesar having now dis lodged his enemy, his next step was not to defeat him but to force him to surrender. Not only would this save him casualties but augment his army, as all prisoners would be incorporated in it. He wished to gain his object by manoeuvring rather than by fighting. Sending his Gallic cavalry over the ford, these nimble horsemen greatly impeded the enemy's march, and gained time for Caesar to cross his infantry.

Die manoeuvres now carried out were remarkable, and are shown on the plan.
(I) Caesar rapidly followed Afranius and forced him to form front
(2) Afranius retired skirmishing, Caesar following
(3) Afranius de cided to retire on Octogesa, Caesar pretending to withdraw, and Afranius made towards the defile
(4) Caesar counter-marched and cut him off from the defile
(5) Afranius reverted to retire ment on Octogesa Afranius was now strategically beaten, and Caesar could have annihilated him but refused to do so
(6) Afranius made for the Sicoris to obtain water
(7) Caesar headed him off
(8) Afranius attempted to regain Ilerda, but was forced to surrender on July 2.

Pompey lost his best legions without scarcely a fight,which led Caesar to quip he had defeated An army without a leader,now it remained to deal with the leader without an army.Soon varro and his mere 2 legions surrender too.Caesar pardons the commanders ,but afarianius and petrius break word and join pompey with whatever forces they can gather in greece.

Having only assembled half the needed sailing ships Caesar decided to take 7 available legions across, and to then have the ships travel back to Brindisi and transport the remaining legions once they had arrived at Brindisi. Travel across the Adriatic Sea to Greece would ordinarily be tricky, but was made more so given that it was winter but the sea was treacherous enough to deter the war galleys of Pompey's fleet, commanded by Caesar's former junior consul Bibulus, at Corfu. As it was winter Bibulus was unprepared and Caesar was able to sail through the blockade easily in an astonishing move which would have appeared suicidal to others and form a beachhead at Epirus with the first half of his army. Bibulus however was able to block Caesar's attempt to sail his reinforcements stuck at Brindisi. Bibulus died while conducting this blockade and no overall naval commander was appointed by Pompey. Libo attempted to make the blockade more secure by seizing the island off Brindisi preventing Caesar's reinforcements from sailing anywhere. However, Libo could not sustain this position because of a lack of water.

Caesar's blunder had put him in the worst possible position any army could find itself in. His army had no way to resupply from Rome due to the naval blockade, he couldn't resupply locally as Greece was pro-Pompey and closed their gates to Caesar, and his army was only at half strength. So dire was his situation that he made several attempts to discuss peace with Pompey but was refused at every channel. Realizing he was going to have to fight his way out, he attempted another winter blockade run back to Italy to lead his remaining forces to Greece. His luck was not with him and the rough seas and storms forced him back. Marc Antony after several attempts evaded Libo's blockade and managed to land at Nympheum with four more legions. It was now a race against time as both Caesar and Pompey rushed to meet Antony. Although Pompey reached Antony first Caesar was right on his heels and Pompey prudently moved his forces to Dyrrachium to prevent becoming caught between the two forces.

Caesar now with 11 legions sent one to southern greece secure supplies and the province and 2 other legions under Calvinus to intercept Metellus scipio who was about to arrive from syria with 2 legions to join pompey.

BATTLE OF DYRRACHIUM :

Dyrrachium was a strong defensive position for Pompey. His back was guarded by the sea, and at his front there were hills that commanded the immediate area. This made an assault on the position nearly impossible.Caesar instead decided to revisit his tactics at Alesia and ordered his engineers to build walls and fortifications to pin Pompey against the sea. Pompey responded with walls and fortifications of his own to prevent any further advance. Between these two fortifications a no man's land was created which saw constant skirmishes with little or no gain. Caesar held the outlying farmland but it had been picked clean and Pompey, with the sea at his back, was able to be resupplied by ship. However, as the siege wore on, their positions began to change. Pompey found it difficult with the limited land he controlled to create enough fodder for his horses, and other supplies such as fresh water became more and more difficult to maintain. The autumn harvest was approaching and soon Caesar would have enough food to prolong his position. This caused Pompey to become desperate to break out of the siege. By mid summer, though, Pompey had a fortunate stroke of luck. Two Gallic auxiliaries were caught stealing the pay from legionaries, but managed to escape to Pompey. With these two men on his side, Pompey was able to discover the weakest point in Caesar's wall.A section to the south of the lines hadn't yet been completed and it was the only viable target for attack.

Pompey mounted an attack of six legions against Caesar's line where it joined the sea and where the Legio IX was stationed. Pompey also sent some auxiliaries and light infantry to attack by sea. Heavily outnumbering the Caesarian troops, the Pompeian troops broke through the weakened fortifications, causing the Ninth to pull back from the onslaught with heavy losses. Caesar swiftly reinforced the breach with 4,000 men, which is twelve cohorts under Antony and then counterattacked, re-securing part of the wall and pushing Pompey's disordered forces back. Alhoewel Caesar's counterattack was initially successful, Pompey's forces were simply too numerous. Some days earlier Pompey had occupied a small camp that had been abandoned by Caesar, and enlarged the defences. Caesar responded by sending 33 cohorts to attack this position. Although the attack was initially successful, the Caesarian troops were outnumbered 2-1 and Pompey's troops fought hard. Pompey sent a large force of infantry and 3,000 cavalry to outflank Caesar's right wing. Caesar first ordered his troops on the right to stand firm, but then saw the danger of being outflanked. He ordered a retreat which soon became a panicked and disordered rout. The counterattack on Pompey's camp disintegrated completely. At first Caesar personally tried to stem the retreat, but the fleeing troops did not stop until they reached their own camps. After the failure of the counterattack and considering the losses incurred, Caesar resolved to give up attempting to besiege Pompey and to change the entire strategy of the campaign - he had lost the strategic initiative.

Pompey ordered a halt, believing that Caesar had been decisively beaten, and also suspecting a trap. According to Plutarch, Caesar remarked on that decision saying, "Today the victory had been the enemy's, had there been any one among them to gain it.''

CONTINUED:


Kyk die video: Pompey, Dyrrahacium 48. u0026 counter thickness (Januarie 2022).